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State v. Stamper4/10/1995
; (2) driving while having a breath-alcohol concentration of greater than .10 grams per two hundred ten liters, pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(A)(3); (3) driving while under a suspension, pursuant to 4507.02(D); and (4) driving left of center, tinder R.C. 4511.25. At his initial appearance, appellant entered a plea of not, guilty to all four charges.
Appellant's pretrial conference was set for April 8, 1993. Six days prior to this conference, appellant's counsel filed a notice with the trial court indicating that on April 2, he had served the state with a request for discovery. Following the conference on April 8, the trial court issued a judgment which merely stated that the parties were required to provide discovery to each other. The trial date was initially set for May 26, 1993.
On April 14, 1993, appellant moved for leave to file a motion to suppress certain evidence on or before May 11. As the basis for this request, appellant asserted that the state had failed to provide discovery in a timely manner. The trial court granted the motion for leave, and the purpose of the May 26 proceeding was altered from a trial on the merits to an evidentiary hearing on the proposed motion to suppress.
On May 11, appellant filed his motion to suppress the results of the breath test and the oral statement he had made to the arresting officer. As one basis for this motion, he argued that the initial stop of his truck had been illegal because the officer had not had a reasonable suspicion that he had violated any traffic laws. As part of the motion, he further maintained that the breath test had not been administered in compliance with the applicable state regulations.
The evidentiary hearing was held as scheduled on May 26, 1993. As a part of this proceeding, both appellant and the arresting officer gave testimony as to what had allegedly occurred prior to the stop of the truck. Based in part upon this testimony, the trial court rendered a judgment denying the motion to suppress in its entirety. This judgment was issued on October 12, 1993.
As to the propriety of the investigative stop, the trial court concluded in the judgment that the fact that the officer had seen appellant driving left of center was sufficient, in and of itself, to justify the stop. The court further held that the facts of the case had supported a reasonable and articulable suspicion that appellant had been driving while under the influence. In support of this holding, the court cited the officer's testimony as to the fishtailing and the fact that appellant's truck had gone off the road momentarily.
Once the suppression judgment had been rendered, appellant's trial was reset for November 30, 1993. One day prior to the new trial date, appellant moved the trial court to dismiss the charges on the ground that the state had failed to bring him to trial within the statutory time limits. Specifically, he argued that the twenty-seven-day period between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the motion to suppress should be charged to the state because the delay could be attributed to the failure of the state to provide discovery in a timely manner.
After the state had filed a response and a hearing had been held on the matter, the trial court issued a judgment denying the motion to dismiss. In relation to the twenty-seven days between the motion for leave and the motion to suppress, the court held that these days were not chargeable to the state because appellant had not made his request for discovery until twenty-two days after his initial appearance.
The judgment on the motion to dismiss was rendered on January 14, 1994. The date for the trial was then
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