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State v. Stamper4/10/1995
hicle drift off the road one time, the arresting officer also saw appellant's vehicle fishtailing and driving left of center.
In support of his position, appellant also cites the recent decision of the Seventh District Court of Appeals in State v. Drogi (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 466, 645 N.E.2d 153. In Drogi, the arresting officer initiated the investigative stop after observing appellant's vehicle cross over the center line by one foot, weave within the lane twice, and then cross over the right edge line by a slight amount. Concluding that the motion to suppress should have been granted, the appellate court emphasized that such minor weaving did not constitute erratic driving upon which a valid stop could be based.
Without commenting upon the merits of the holding in Drogi, we would again note that the facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those in Drogi, in that the investigative stop was predicated upon more than just the one instance in which appellant's vehicle drifted off the right side of the road.
Taken as a whole, the facts of this case support the legal conclusion that the officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for suspecting that appellant was driving while under the influence. Moreover, as the trial court noted, thsstop could have been based solely upon the driving left of center, as this constituted a separate violation of a traffic law. See State v. Gwin (Dec. 16, 1994), Portage App. No. 94-P-0013, unreported, 1994 WL 721616; State v. Takacs (Feb. 25, 1994), Lake App. No. 93-L-087, unreported, 1994 WL 102221. Thus, since the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress, his first assignment lacks merit.
Under his second assignment, appellant contests the denial of both of his motions to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. In support of his basic contention that the pending charges should have been dismissed, appellant has advanced three separate arguments for consideration. First, he submits that the trial court erred in holding that twenty-seven days between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the motion to suppress should not be charged to the state.
R.C. 4511.99(A) provides that a violation of either R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) or (A)(3) constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree. Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), the state was required to bring appellant to trial within ninety days following his arrest on March 10, 1993.
The following is a synopsis of the various events relevant to our analysis of the speedy trial issue:
March 11, 1993--Appellant makes an initial appearance on the four charges. A pretrial conference is set for April 8, 1993.
April 2, 1993--Appellant moves for leave to file a motion to suppress on or before May 11, 1993. On the same date, the trial court issues judgment granting the motion for leave.
April 8, 1993--A pretrial conference is held, The trial court issues judgment ordering the parties to provide discovery.
May 11, 1993--Appellant files his motion to suppress the results of the breath test and the oral statement he made to the arresting officer.
May 26, 1993--An evidentiary hearing is held on the motion to suppress.
October 12, 1993--The trial court, issues judgment denying the motion to suppress. The trial is subsequently reset for November 30, 1993.
November 29, 1993--Appellant filed his first motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.
January 14, 1993--The trial court issues judgment denying the first motion to dismiss. The trial is subsequently reset for February 2, 1994.
February 2, 1994--Appellant files
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