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State v. Stamper4/10/1995
his second motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.
March 2, 1994--A hearing is held on the second motion to dismiss. Upon denying the second motion, the trial court accepts appellant's plea of no contest and finds him guilty of driving while having a breath-alcohol concentration of greater than .10 grams per two hundred ten liters and driving left of center. The trial court issues judgments sentencing appellant on these two charges.
March 3, 1994--The trial court issues judgment denying the second motion to dismiss.
Appellant's first motion to dismiss was filed on November 29, 1993, some 263 days after appellant's arrest. This entire period of time comprised the following blocks of time: (1) thirty-four days between the arrest and the filing of appellant's motion for leave, (2) twenty-seven days between the filing of the motion for leave and the filing of the motion to suppress, (3) one hundred fifty-four days between the filing of the motion to suppress and the issuance of the trial court's judgment on the motion to suppress, and (4) forty-eight days between the issuance of the judgment and the riling of the first motion to dismiss.
In arguing that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial, appellant contends that three of those blocks of time were chargeable to the state. Specifically, he argues first that the twenty-seven days between the filings of the motion for leave and the motion to suppress should be charged to the state because the delay caused by the motion for leave was caused by the failure of the state to provide discovery in a timely manner.
In rejecting the foregoing argument, the trial court held that the record before it supported the conclusion that the delay in the beginning of the discovery process, which in turn caused the delay in the filing of the motion to suppress, was directly attributable to appellant. Upon independently reviewing the record, this court finds the trial court's analysis to be persuasive.
Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C), a motion to suppress must be filed within thirty-five days after the defendant has been arraigned on the charges. Akron v. Milewski (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 140, 21 OBR 149, 487 N.E.2d 582. In the instant case, appellant's request for discovery was not served on the state until twenty-two days after he had been arraigned at his initial appearance. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the motion to suppress could be written in one day, appellant gave the state ten days to provide discovery than it had taken him to serve his request, i.e., appellant gave the state only twelve days in which to respond.
Although the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure do not delineate any specific time limit for responding to a discovery request, logic dictates that the time needed to provide a proper response would be greater than the time needed to serve the actual request. As to this point, the court notes, as did the trial court, that Crim.R. 16(F) provides that a motion for discovery must be filed within twenty-one days after arraignment. Since a motion for discovery is not proper until after the state has failed to respond to the request for discovery, it follows that the defendant is expected under the rules to serve the request within a few days after arraignment.
R.C. 2945.72(A) states that the running of the statutory time for bringing a defendant to trial is tolled for any period of delay made necessary by a motion filed by the defendant. The record in this case supports the conclusion that the fact that appellant needed extra time to file his motion to suppress was not caused by any dilatory action on the part of the state, but instead was caused by ap
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