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Robertson v. City and County of Denver5/2/1994
etermined if the ordinance is reasonably related to public health, welfare, or safety or is rationally related to some other legitimate governmental interest.
Our prior cases provide substantial guidance in determining whether the ordinance in this case is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. Blue establishes that any regulation of firearms must preserve the constitutional rights afforded by article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution:
To be sure, the state legislature cannot, in the name of the police power, enact laws which render nugatory our Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections.
Blue, 190 Colo. at 103, 544 P.2d at 391.
As a threshold matter, it is clear that the General Assembly does not have the power to disarm the citizenry, or a class of citizens of the State. People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 265, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (1936) ("The police power of a state cannot transcend the fundamental law, and cannot be exercised in such a manner as to work a practical abrogation of its provisions."). In Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 23, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (1972), we determined that a municipal ordinance that prohibited possession of a firearm outside of a residence was unconstitutional. We analyzed the ordinance by questioning whether it prohibited legal activity:
An analysis of the foregoing ordinance reveals that it is so general in its scope that it includes within its prohibitions the right to carry on certain businesses and to engage in certain activities which cannot under the police powers be reasonably classified as unlawful and thus, subject to criminal sanctions. As an example, we note that this ordinance would prohibit gunsmiths, pawnbrokers and sporting goods stores from carrying on a substantial part of their business. Also, the ordinance appears to prohibit individuals from transporting guns to and from such places of business. Furthermore, it makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm in a vehicle or in a place of business for the purpose of self-defense.
Id. at 20, 501 P.2d at 745. We have stated that Pillow "involved a broad prohibition [that] unduly infringed on the personal liberty of bearing arms." Blue, 190 Colo. at 104, 544 P.2d at 391. Blue addressed a statute that limited a felon's right to possess, use, or carry a firearm. In reviewing the statute, we noted the statute was constitutional in part because it "does not abrogate an ex-felon's right to legitimately use self-defense." Id. at 103, 544 P.2d at 391 (emphasis added).
These cases establish that in the context of regulating firearms, "legitimacy" has a specific meaning: firearms regulation is not a legitimate exercise of the state's police power if it prohibits or abrogates legal activity or unduly infringes on an individual's right to bear arms. If this narrow definition of legitimacy is not recognized, almost any law regulating firearms could be justified as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power in protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.
B
Historically, our General Assembly has regulated possession of firearms that are designed to inflict serious bodily injury or death in either warfare or in violation of the criminal laws. Section 18-12-102, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1993 Supp.), provides:
Possessing a dangerous or illegal weapon--affirmative defenses.
(1) As us
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