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Robertson v. City and County of Denver5/2/1994
luence of intoxicating liquor or of a narcotic or dangerous drug. Doing so, we recognized that "the right to bear arms is not absolute, and it can be restricted by the state's valid exercise of its police power." Id. at 552, 595 P.2d at 230 (citing Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975)). In light of this fact we held:
It is clearly reasonable for the legislature to regulate the possession of firearms by those who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Unlike City of Lakewood, the statute here proscribes only that behavior which can rationally be considered illegitimate, and thus properly prohibited by the state's exercise of its police power. Accordingly, the statute does not restrict the exercise of any fundamental right and is not overbroad.
Id. at 553, 595 P.2d at 230.
As in every other case of this court construing article II, section 13, the Garcia court did not find it necessary to determine the status of the right to bear arms in self-defense. Rather, the court considered whether the law at issue constituted a reasonable exercise of the State's police power and was therefore constitutional.
As these cases make clear, when confronted with a challenge to the validity of a statute or ordinance regulating the exercise of the right to bear arms guaranteed under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, a reviewing court need not determine the status of that right. Rather, the question in each case is whether the law at issue constitutes a reasonable exercise of the state's police power.
This approach is in accordance with the vast majority of cases construing state constitutional provisions which guarantee an individual's right to bear arms in self-defense.
That the right to bear arms is not an unlimited right and is subject to reasonable regulation is an accepted principle among other jurisdictions. The majority of the cases which have decided this issue have taken the position that legislation which regulates or prohibits the possession or use of certain arms must be reasonable to be a valid exercise of the police power.
Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163, 172 (Ohio 1993) (citations omitted). See also Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1984) (right to bear arms under the Illinois Constitution is subject to substantial regulation under the state's police power); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 36 Conn. Supp. 108, 413 A.2d 489 (Conn. 1979) (right to bear arms subject to reasonable exercise of police power); Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972) (right to bear arms subject to valid police power regulation); Carson v. State, 241 Ga. 622, 247 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Ga. 1978) ("the question in each case being whether the particular regulation involved is legitimate and reasonably within the police power, or whether . . . under the name of regulation, amounts to a deprivation of the constitutional right") (quotations omitted); Kalodimos v. Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266, 273, 83 Ill. Dec. 308 (Ill. 1984) (right to bear arms under the Illinois Constitution is subject to substantial regulation under the state's police power); Matthews v. State, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958) (right to bear arms subject to reasonable exercise of police power); State v. Hamlin, 497 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1986) (same); People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931) (same); State v. LaChapelle, 234 Neb. 458, 451 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 1990) (same); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 669 P.2d 261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (same); Grimm v. New York, 56 Misc. 2d 525, 289 N.Y.S.2d 35
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