Duncan v. Missouri Department of Corrections2/11/2003
on October 17, 1998, which constituted a breach of a condition of probation, whereas he was taken into custody for driving while intoxicated in St. Francois County on January 10, 1999. Mr. Duncan's probation was revoked for a separate and distinct act from his conduct that prompted his subsequent conviction on the St. Francois County DWI offense. For that reason, Goings is distinguishable from the present case.
Mr. Duncan asserts that section 558.031.1, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998, does not condition jail time credit on the basis of whether it was the new offense that resulted in his probation revocation. He misconstrues the statute. Mr. Duncan's probation revocation was the result of conduct that occurred prior and unrelated to the new criminal offense for which he was convicted in St. Francois County. He is not entitled to receive jail time credit for the St. Francois County conviction from March 4, 1999, to January 21, 2000, because his time in custody during that time period was the result of the Madison County conviction, his probation revocation, and the execution of the imposed sentence. His time in custody during this period was, moreover, unrelated to the St. Francois County charge.
As established by the trial court, Mr. Duncan's time in custody from January 10, 1999, to March 4, 1999, was related to the St. Francois County DWI charge. Once his probation was revoked for the Madison County conviction on March 4, 1999, he began serving the imposed sentence. From March 4, 1999, the date his probation was revoked on the Madison County conviction, to January 21, 2000, the date he was sentenced on the St. Francois County DWI charge, Mr. Duncan's time in custody was related to the sentence imposed in Madison County. Because he was incarcerated between March 4, 1999, and January 21, 2000, for the purpose of serving the Madison County DWI conviction, the time he was in custody during this time period was unrelated to the St. Francois County DWI charge and, thus, he was not entitled to jail time credit for that period. The purpose of section 558.031.1, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998, to "ensure that an indigent accused awaiting trial does not serve a longer term than an accused able to meet [bail], who can thereby avoid confinement before trial and sentence," is not contravened by denying credit for the time Mr. Duncan was in custody from March 4, 1999, to January 21, 2000, toward both convictions. Goings, 6 S.W.3d at 908.
Mr. Duncan's fourth and fifth points on appeal are unclear. Rule 84.04 (d) governs the requirements for asserting a point relied on. Each point relied on must: "(1) identify the trial court's ruling or action that the appellant is challenging on appeal; (2) state the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (3) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error." Rule 84.04 (d)(1)(A)-(C) Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure (2002); Wilson v. Carnahan, 25 S.W.3d 666, 666 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) (quoting Hall v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 10 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999)). The purpose of the rule is to provide "notice to the opposing party of the precise matters which must be contended with and to inform the court of the issues presented for review." Wilson, 25 S.W.3d at 666. Points four and five do not communicate sufficiently to be understood what matters Mr. Duncan wants reviewed. Given Mr. Duncan's failure to comply with Rule 84.04 (d) on the fourth and fifth points on appeal, these points are not addressed.
The judgment of the trial court denying Mr. Duncan's petition for declaratory judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
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