STATE v. ORTIZ1/5/1993
e to perceive these risks was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. Consequently, the defendant's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, there was ample evidence to support the jury's determination that the defendant's conduct in the operation of his motor vehicle constituted criminal negligence.
CAUSATION
The defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct caused the deaths of the Wickers. He argues that both the negligent conduct of the motorcycle driver and the fact that no witnesses observed similar misconduct on his part in the operation of his vehicle, preclude a finding that his conduct proximately caused the deaths. We do not agree.
In State v. Alterio, 154 Conn. 23, 220 A.2d 451 (1966), our Supreme Court considered a statute quite similar to 53a-57. The Alterio court concluded that " t was
the state's burden to prove that a proximate cause of the death was the unlawful acts of the defendants. [and that] ` very person is held to be responsible for the natural consequences of his acts, and if he commits a felonious act and death follows, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated to produce that result.' State v. Leopold, [110 Conn. 55, 61, 147 A. 118 (1930)]." (Citations omitted.) State v. Alterio, supra, 29-30; see also State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 233, 405 A.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 1248, 59 L.Ed.2d 475 (1979). "An act or omission to act is the proximate cause of death when it substantially and materially contributes, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient, intervening cause, to the resulting death." Id., 234. The contributory negligence of the victim does not prevent proof of causation, unless it constitutes an independent and efficient cause or an intervening and efficient cause. State v. Kwaak, 21 Conn. App. 138, 145-46, 572 A.2d 1015, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 811, 567 A.2d 540 (1990).
In the present case, the jury could reasonably have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the criminally negligent conduct of the defendant while operating a motor vehicle caused the deaths of the Wickers. The jury could have concluded that but for the defendant's failure to negotiate the turn properly and his failure to yield the right-of-way to the approaching motorcycle, the car and the motorcycle would not have collided. The jury could also have reasonably found that the negligent conduct of Charles Wicker, even if such conduct contributed to the deaths, was neither an independent and efficient, nor an intervening and efficient cause. The defendant's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, we believe that the jury, after considering all of the evidence, could reasonably have found that had the defendant carefully looked for approaching
traffic, appropriately assessed the speed of the oncoming motorcycle, and quickly responded to the existing and foreseeable traffic hazard, his car would not have been crossing the northbound lanes of Prospect Street at the critical moment, and the speeding motorcycle would have passed by safely. The criminally negligent conduct of the defendant, therefore, was a substantial link in the unbroken chain of events that resulted in the deaths of the Wickers, and the jury properly held the defendant answerable for the consequences of his conduct. State v. Spates, supra, 233.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty on the two counts of misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of Gen
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