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State v. Crane12/12/1989
h 3, 1989, the jury found the appellant guilty of the offense of DUI, a misdemeanor
The sole issue before this Court is whether the District Court erroneously denied the appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial
Appellant argues that every person accused of a crime is guaranteed the fundamental right to a speedy trial by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment State v. Chavez (1984), 213 Mont. 434, 691 P.2d 1365. This right in Montana is also secured by § 24, Art. II, of the Montana Constitution. State v. Ackley (1982), 201 Mont. 252, 653 P.2d 851. When considering misdemeanor charges, such as the charge against the appellant here, these constitutional requirements are implemented by § 46-13-201(2), MCA, which mandates a six-month statute of limitations in which persons must be brought to trial
It is the appellant's position that under the terms of § 46-13-201(2), MCA, his right to a speedy trial would have expired on July 17, 1988, but for appellant's counsel's June 22, 1988 motion for continuance because of conflicting trial date Appellant argues that the waiver of speedy trial date of June 22, 1988, was not specific in scope or length at the time of the waiver, and was not set forth in the motion for continuance Appellant's counsel did not indicate that the waiver was nothing but a waiver of a right to a speedy trial with respect to the day of the conflicting trial date According to the appellant, his speedy trial rights evaporated on either of the following dates: December 22, 1988 (six months after the date of the appellant's motion for continuance); or September 20, 1988 (45 days after the August 4, 1988 trial date which had been set as a result of appellant's motion)
The respondent State argues that the appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under § 46-13-201(2), MCA, in that it does not apply in this case. Section 46-13-201(2), MCA, states:
"(2) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution to be dismissed if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon his application is not brought to trial within 6 months after entry of plea upon a complaint, information, or indictment charging a misdemeanor."
The above section mandates dismissal of a misdemeanor charge not brought to trial within six months if the defendant has not asked for a postponement, and if the State has not shown good cause for the delay. While this Court has not specifically ruled on the applicability of this section when a defendant has asked for a postponement, the language of the statute makes it clear that the six-month limitation does not apply in this case
In construing a statute, it is our function as an appellate court to ascertain and declare what in terms or in substance is contained in a statute and not insert what has been omitted Dunphy v. Anaconda (1968), 151 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. In State v. Ronningen (1984), 213 Mont. 358, 691 P.2d 1348, this Court stated: "But the statute is clear and the facts are clear If the defendant requests the postponement the six-month trial deadline does not apply." Ronningen, 691 P.2d at 1350. Here the appellant's trial was postponed upon his own application of June 22, 1988, before the six-month time limit had expired. We find no statute which allows the six-month period to be extended after a delay has been caused by the appellant. Thus, we hold that § 46-13-201(2), MCA, has no application in the instant case
We find the length of the delay is what triggers a speedy trial inquiry. Here there were 410 days between the ap
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