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City of Cheney v. Grunewald10/24/1989
that inherent in a jury trial is a right to an unbiased jury. Rowley v. Group Health Coop., 16 Wash. App. 373, 375, 556 P.2d 250 (1976). A prospective juror must be excused for cause if the trial court determines the juror is actually or impliedly biased. RCW 4.44.170, .180. Mr. Grunewald alleges actual bias, that is
the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging, . . .
RCW 4.44.170(2). Even though a juror holds preconceived ideas, a juror need not be disqualified if he can put those aside and decide the case based on the evidence and the law. RCW 4.44.190; State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 569, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963). The denial of a challenge for cause lies within the discretion of the trial court which will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse. State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wash. 2d 603, 590 P.2d 809 (1979). If a juror should have been excused for cause, but was not, the remedy is reversal. Miles v. F.E.R.M. Enters., Inc., 29 Wash. App. 61, 64, 627 P.2d 564 (1981).
Actual bias is not presumed simply by Mr. Bauman's association with a particular organization. See United States v. Carr, 584 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1978); State v. Jones, S.C. , 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989); State v. Bernson, 40 Wash. App. 729, 700 P.2d 758, review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1016 (1985); State v. Gosser, 33 Wash. App. 428, 656 P.2d 514 (1982). Nor would his personal experience based upon the death of his niece alone disqualify him from serving on the jury. United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980); State v. Gilcrist, supra.
However, when these circumstances are coupled with the answer that he would not want six jurors with his frame of mind on the jury if he were in Mr. Grunewald's position and that he would not receive a fair trial with six such jurors, sufficient actual bias was demonstrated to justify his removal for cause. As noted in Rowley v. Group Health Coop., supra at 377 (quoting Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956)),
it is a good rule for the trial judge to honor challenges for cause whenever he may reasonably suspect that circumstances outside the evidence may create bias or an appearance of bias on the part of the challenged juror.
Here, there was a reasonable suspicion of bias based on Mr. Bauman's contradictory answers on voir dire. Consequently, there was sufficient justification for the court to have granted Mr. Grunewald's challenge for cause. Its failure to do so was error.
Reversed and remanded for retrial.
Disposition
Holding that the trial court should have granted a challenge for cause against a juror who was a member of Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, the court reverses the judgment.
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