 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Miller v. State12/14/1989
e presentation by the litigants before review by this court. We need not blithely or blindly follow the current aberration observable from the United States Supreme Court by copying its unfortunate pathway taken in a number of recent occasions to rush to redefined standards of the law. This judicial aptitude is particularly illustrated by dissenting comments found in a course of cases within only one current term. In Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2724-25, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting), it was indicated:
In granting certiorari in this case we did not, as the Court would have it, agree to review the question whether one may bring a suit for damages under § 1981 itself on the basis of governmental conduct. * * * In six years of proceedings in the lower courts, including a jury trial and an appeal that produced two opinions, respondent never once suggested that Jett's only remedy was furnished by § 1983. Petitioner was able to respond to this argument only in his reply brief in this Court. While it is true that we often affirm a judgment on a ground not relied upon by the court below, we ordinarily do so only when that ground at least was raised below. * * *
It is not only unfair to decide the case on this basis, it is unwise. The question is important; to resolve it on the basis of largely one-sided briefing, without the benefit of the views of the courts below, is rash. It is also unnecessary. The Court appears to decide today (though its precise holding is less than pellucid) that liability for violations by the government of § 1981 may not be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior. The answer to that question would dispose of Jett's contentions. In choosing to decide, as well, whether § 1983 furnishes the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 by the government, the Court makes many mistakes that might have been avoided by a less impetuous course.
In Teague v. Lane, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1084, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1771, 104 L.Ed.2d 206 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), it was stated:
Today a plurality of this Court, without benefit of briefing and oral argument, adopts a novel threshold test for federal review of state criminal convictions on habeas corpus. It does so without regard for — indeed, without even mentioning — our contrary decisions over the past 35 years delineating the broad scope of habeas relief. The plurality further appears oblivious to the importance we have consistently accorded the principle of stare decisis in non-constitutional cases. Out of an exaggerated concern for treating similarly situated habeas petitioners the same, the plurality would for the first time preclude the federal courts from considering on collateral review a vast range of important constitutional challenges; where those challenges have merit, it would bar the vindication of personal constitutional rights and deny society a check against further violations until the same claim is presented on direct review. In my view, the plurality's "blind adherence to the principle of treating like cases alike" amounts to "letting the tail wag the dog" when it stymies the resolution of substantial and unheralded constitutional questions. Griffin v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 332, 107 S.Ct. 708, 718, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Because I cannot acquiesce in this unprecedented curtailment of the reach of the Great Writ, particularly in the absence of any discussion of these momentous changes by the parties or the lower courts, I dissent.
In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 207, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988), J
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Wyoming DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|