 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Miller v. State12/14/1989
lieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit." Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).[ ] Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984 n. 4, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989).
It seems improper, as well as dangerous in the long run, to allow prior bad acts or previous convictions of the defendant to reduce the burdens imposed originally on government before it convicts and punishes citizens. That is my jurisprudential view. However, if this majority seeks to reduce the task imposed originally on government before citizens are punished, that reduction should at least be done openly in the light of day. The court created W.R.E. 404(b) and 609 and the court can abolish those rules with the stroke of a pen. When the exceptions to W.R.E. 404(b) can be illustrated by a lengthy footnote, Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974-76 (Wyo. 1989), the rule has no meaning as a governing principle. There is enough legal fiction as it is.
It is difficult and probably improvident to appropriately consider a topic as broadly emplaced in the law as the impeachment of a defendant by prior conviction when we have the kind of a record now presented and the decision of this court is made on a plain error context by appellate court decision of the adequacy of trial objection. However, the power of dicta condemns any casual acceptance at this juncture of the broad character of issues raised which belie simplistic disposition. The complexity is not ameliorated by the current decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding a differentiated function of the rules of evidence for civil trials. Green, 109 S.Ct. 1981.
The first difficulty advanced in this case occurs with the fact that no motion in limine was made to anchor any prior conviction to its relevancy with the crime charged to the defendant. "Generally the question of which convictions will be usable to attack credibility should be determined prior to trial." 3 Weinstein's Evidence, United States Rules § 609
at 609-95 (1988). The second difficulty is the inability to pin-point whether the prior offense was considered to fall within W.R.E. 609(a)(2) dishonesty or false statement, or W.R.E. 609(a)(1) probative value outweighing the prejudicial effect. If the former is used for admissibility, the decision was erroneous as a matter of law. 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 317 at 332 (1979). Conversely, if the basis is invested in the balanced test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, the decision was factually unjustified in this case and consequently, an abuse of discretion. Id. at § 315; Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). No discussion is provided for this appeal regarding the W.R.E. 404(b) ingredients of the obtained and introduced bad character evidence. See Pena, 780 P.2d 316 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
Clearly, the offensive foray of the prosecutor here did not achieve the territorial umbrella for a conviction within W.R.E. 609(a)(2) of crimes "involv dishonesty or false statement" by any majority application of that rule. Rationally constrained also is usage of the cross-examination impeachment where the evidence of conviction had a minimal probative factor related to the fact
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Wyoming DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|