Thomas v. State4/18/1977
and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty years." Section 6-58, W.S. 1957.
"When the death of any person ensues within 1 year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide." Section 31-232(a), W.S. 1957, C. 1967.
Our inquiry is confined to the question, Did § 31-232(a) and earlier related enactments impliedly repeal that part of § 6-58, which states, "or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness," insofar as it affects deaths resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle?
Earlier, in Cantrell, supra, it was clearly decided that an implied repeal of the manslaughter statute was not effected insofar as the commission of an unlawful act was concerned, 186 P.2d at 542, but the court definitely refused to answer the query here presented, leaving it for another day. Mr. Justice Blume expressed this dilemma well when he said in Cantrell, supra, 186 P.2d at 548, "It is impossible to determine definitely as to whether or not the legislature when it passed these special statutes intended that they should govern in all cases when a death occurs as the result of improper driving of an automobile."
The indictments and information herein all charge the commission of an unlawful act, i.e., driving on the wrong side of the highway and culpable neglect and criminal carelessness. However, the commission of an unlawful act is not before us because the trial judge submitted this charge to the jury:
"Before you can convict the Defendant on the charge of involuntary manslaughter you must find that he acted with culpable neglect or criminal carelessness. Those terms are synonymous and mean the failure to exercise any care, or the exercise of so little care that you are justified in believing that the person whose conduct is involved was wholly indifferent to the consequences of his conduct and to the welfare of others."
From this instruction, which is the law of the case, it is clear that the only basis of this conviction is reliance upon the last portion of § 6-58 as above set out. As noticed in State v. Wilson, supra, 301 P.2d at 1058, there is no other state which we have been able to find where the crime of involuntary manslaughter is defined as it is in our statute. If follows we can find no direct authority from other jurisdictions which help in defining the application of this statute and the conduct to which it is directed. However, there is authority from this court which helps us to determine what course of conduct this latter part of the statute was intended to cover.
Repeals by implication are not favored, State v. Cantrell, supra, 186 P.2d at 543; but this court has not hesitated to apply this in a proper case, Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834; Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294, 296; Tucker v. State ex rel. Snow, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 P. 460, 465. If the statutes cannot stand together and if they are repugnant by virtue of relating to the same subject and are directed at a distinct offense with the same object, the earlier cannot stand, State v. Cantrell, supra. In Haines v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167, 13 P. 8, 11, the court recognized the rule that a later specific statute controls over a general statute.
In making disposal of this it is necessary to determine what conduct is made criminal by the challenged portion of § 6-58, and under these words, "culpable neglect" and "criminal carelessness," which are synonymous, State v. McComb, supra, 239 P. at 528; State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203, 215.
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