 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
STATE v. BRADFORD12/10/1993
ted. He asserts that such courtroom demonstrations which are designed to influence the administration of justice "are antithetical to due process." He discusses Norris v. Risley, 878 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1989), in which
the petitioner alleged that the presence of women spectators from a rape task force who wore "Women Against Rape" buttons deprived him of a fair trial. The Norris court noted that a reasonable inference was that the women were attempting to press for a conviction. The court reasoned that demonstrations designed to influence the outcome in a courtroom are impermissible. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the circumstances surrounding the buttons were prejudicial. 878 F.2d at 1183.
Bradford believes that the trial court, in the case at bar, should have ordered the spectators to remove their buttons at an earlier time in the proceeding. He reasons that the court had a clear view of the spectators and had an obligation to help guarantee a fair trial. He explains that defense counsel had his back to the spectators and, consequently, could not move for the mistrial until he had seen a button during recess. Bradford asserts that the family's show of support, which was not subject to cross-examination, indicated that he was guilty and prejudiced the outcome of his trial.
The trial court ordered the buttons removed when the matter was brought to its attention. Bradford has failed to provide evidence that any of the jurors saw or were influenced by the buttons. The button incident is controlled by State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 713 P.2d 457 (1986), in which spectators at trial wore Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD) buttons. McNaught failed to show that he was prejudiced by the wearing of the buttons. We could not, as a matter of law, say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to require the spectators to remove the buttons. 238 Kan. at 580-81.
Additionally, Bradford reasons that when a defendant is tried in prison attire, "an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play," quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, 96 S.Ct. 1691 (1976). He asserts that the jury's viewing a defendant in handcuffs violates the right to a fair trial, citing U.S. v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 492 U.S. 910 (1989). Bradford believes that the same principles apply with equal force to the situation in the instant case where Wright, a defense witness, appeared
at trial in chains. He claims that the chains could have caused jurors to base their credibility conclusions on unacceptable factors. Bradford asserts that the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial on either of the described grounds was error. We do not agree.
Bradford called Wright to testify concerning events that allegedly occurred while he and Wright were incarcerated. Bradford did not request that either the jail chains or jail garb be removed. Wright's courtroom appearance was controlled by Bradford, not by the State. Bradford exposed the fact that Wright had been in jail. The trial court offered to have the chains removed when Wright's appearance was first brought to the court's attention. We find no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
|