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Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vermeersch6/30/1993
unicated to the officer.
If respondent is correct, the Implied Consent Statute would be of limited effectiveness; a driver who refuses to take a breath test could nevertheless substantially comply with the statute and thus avoid its consequences, simply by subsequently obtaining an independent blood test. Such a result is wholly inconsistent with the legislative policy underlying the Implied Consent Statute.
A statute is to be construed reasonably and with reference to the Legislature's purpose, aim or policy as reflected in that statute. Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 463, 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991), quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). In that case, we noted that this Court has:
consistently recognized that the statutory provisions enacted to enforce the State's fight against drunken driving, namely Md. Code (1989, 1991 Cum. Supp.), § 10-302-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, were enacted for the protection of the public and not primarily for the protection of the accused.
Id. at 464, 597 A.2d at 943-44, quoting State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 477, 436 A.2d 420, 427 (1981). See State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529 536-37, 474 A.2d 898, 902. One of the methods the Legislature chose to accomplish that purpose was to provide an incentive for drivers detained under suspicion of drunk driving to take, rather than refuse, a test for alcohol concentration. Shrader, 324 Md. at 464, 597 A.2d at 944. Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 313, 604 A.2d at 922. This was sought to be accomplished by providing a sanction - i.e., "an outcome that is certain to happen," Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 320, 604 A.2d at 925 - significantly more severe for refusal than for taking and failing the test.
The Legislature contemplated not only that, "the suspension of the driver's license must occur whenever the statutory prerequisites have been met, § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v)," but that the sanction applicable to the option the driver chose also occur. Unless that scheme continues to obtain, fulfillment of the legislative purpose cannot be assured.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY WITH DIRECTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
Disposition
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY WITH DIRECTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.
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