 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
STATE v. MENDROS4/8/1993
Defendant Stavros Mendros appeals his conviction for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp. 1992) entered after a jury-waived trial in Superior Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, J.). Defendant asks us to reinterpret the statute, claims insufficient evidence for a conviction, contends that the court committed obvious error in admitting a blood alcohol test result without adequate foundation, and challenges the statute's constitutionality as previously interpreted. We reject defendant's invitation to reinterpret the statute, and finding no constitutional defect or other error, we affirm the judgment.
Defendant was driving home after a fraternity function on Indian Island in the early morning of Dec. 21, 1991, when he was stopped by a Penobscot Indian Nation police officer who observed that his car had no license plate light. After smelling alcohol and observing that defendant had bloodshot and glassy eyes, the officer asked defendant to exit his car, then administered between 8 p.m. and midnight, did not consume any alcohol for close to four hours, then gargled with a shot of 151 proof rum (said to be like straight alcohol) and had another drink of the alcoholic mixture immediately before driving his car. The court found him guilty of operating under the influence but found reasonable doubt whether he had an excessive blood alcohol level. This appeal followed.
Defendant contends that our reading of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B to criminalize a person's operation of a motor vehicle when his physical or mental facilities are impaired by alcohol, however slightly, exceeds any rational relationship to public safety. See State v. Bento, 600 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Me. 1991). He argues that the statute as interpreted conflicts with society's tolerance of some social drinking and with medical research showing that very slight alcohol consumption affects mental or physical faculties.
We have discerned a heightened legislative perception "that the public is endangered by persons who drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs regardless of the extent of that influence. . . . Not only dangerous driving, but also creating a risk of dangerous driving, is to be penalized." State v. Bean, 430 A.2d 1109, 1111 (Me. 1981). Defendant fails to present any compelling reason for us to reconsider our past decision. If, as defendant maintains, consuming even small amounts of alcohol impairs physical and mental performance, that fact does not undermine the rationale of the law as we have interpreted it.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's conviction, we view the evidence in favor of the State to determine whether the factfinder rationally could find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Webber, 613 A.2d 375, 377 (Me. 1992). The officer's testimony of defendant's physical condition, defendant's poor performance on two of the three field sobriety tests administered by the officer, and defendant's testimony provide ample support for the court's finding.
Although the result of defendant's blood alcohol test was admitted without evidence that the officer was qualified or certified to administer the test or that the analyzer was certified, the test result was not necessary to the court's finding, and the court did not indicate that it relied on it. Because there was no objection at trial, we review for obvious error and find none.
Finally, defendant argues that 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B and 1312(5) (Supp. 1992) violate state and federal due process because the statutorily authorized inferences contradict the "medical learning" that even small amounts of
Page 1 2 Maine DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|