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People v. Leung4/9/1992
Civil Procedure section 223 applies only to criminal proceedings. By so limiting its scope, it distinguishes between criminal and civil jury trials and therefore between criminal and civil litigants. It is this distinction which is challenged as a violation of equal protection. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the distinction drawn between criminal and civil litigants and proceedings is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose served by this statute. Substantial distinctions exist between criminal and civil jury trials. In every criminal trial, the state is a party, acting for the protection of the people of the state, while a civil trial involves a private dispute which one of the parties has chosen to litigate in the forum provided by the state for such actions. (Pen. Code, § 684.) However, this distinction does not directly relate to the purposes of the statute at issue here.
The California Supreme Court has held that "a greater possibility that the right conferred by the statute would be abused" is a reason sufficient to justify granting civil litigants the right to peremptorily challenge a trial Judge while withholding that right from criminal litigants. (Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 693, 699-700 [329 P.2d 5].) Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 originally allowed civil litigants, but not criminal litigants, to peremptorily challenge a trial Judge. (50 Cal. 2d at p. 701.) Petitioners in Johnson were plaintiffs in a civil action. They filed the requisite motion to disqualify the Judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The presiding Judge denied the motion apparently in violation of the statute. The plaintiffs then sought a writ of mandate to compel the assignment of another Judge. (50 Cal. 2d at p. 695.) Respondents argued that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, "because it applies only to a 'civil' action or special proceeding, discriminates against parties in criminal cases in violation of federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable classifications. (U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment; [former] Cal. Const., art. I, § 11, 21; art. IV, § 25.)" (50 Cal. 2d at p. 699.)
The California Supreme Court rejected this equal protection challenge. "The rights of parties in civil and criminal trials are, of course, different in many respects .... Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature as to the making of a classification, and every presumption is in favor of validity; the decision of the Legislature as to what constitutes a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification 'will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous.' (State v. Industrial Acc. Com., 48 Cal. 2d 365, 371 [310 P.2d 7]; Dribin v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 345, 351 [231 P.2d 809, 24 A.L.R.2d 864].) In enacting [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.6, the Legislature could have concluded that, in criminal cases, there would be a greater possibility that the right conferred by the statute would be abused, and it cannot be said that this distinction was insufficient to justify withholding the right as to such cases." (50 Cal. 2d at pp. 699- 700.) The court
concluded that the statute's distinction between criminal and civil proceedings was ration
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