Motor Vehicle Administration v. Chamberlain4/14/1992
ril 26, 1990, thirty-six days after the MVA received the request. See § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined, inter alia, that Chamberlain refused the test after proper advice, see § 16-205.1(f)(8)(i), and, accordingly, suspended his license for 120 days. See § 16-205.1(f)(8)(v). Chamberlain filed a timely appeal to the circuit court, raising three of the four issues he argued before the ALJ. His suspension, which had not been stayed
after the ALJ's decision, was administratively stayed, pursuant to § 16-205.1(f)(5)(v), on May 3, 1990, seven days after the hearing, and two days after the MVA received notice of the appeal.
Despite a dispute between the parties as to whether the appeal could properly proceed because a segment of the hearing had not been properly recorded -- Chamberlain urged that the appropriate remedy was reversal of his license suspension, while the appellant maintained that the appeal should proceed, the legal issues being adequately addressed in the record and preserved for review --, the case was remanded to the MVA for a new hearing on August 24, 1990. The remand hearing was not held until November 1, 1990. The record does not reflect when that date was set. Section 16-205.1(f)(5)(vi) provides that " o the extent possible, the administration shall expeditiously reschedule a hearing that is postponed under this paragraph."
Chamberlain's argument proceeds on two premises: (1) the word "shall", as used in subsection (f)(5)(vi), is mandatory and (2) the objective of the administrative per se law is to provide prompt, and certain, sanctions for those who drink and drive. The latter premise is undoubtedly correct. See Shrader, 324 Md. at 464-467, 597 A.2d at 944-45. But so is the former. From these premises, Chamberlain argues, relying on State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for a failure expeditiously to schedule a postponed hearing. This is so, he reasons, because that failure undermines public confidence in the judicial system and thwarts the achievement of the purposes of the law.
To be sure, the definition of postponement, as used in § 16-205.1(f)(5), is exceedingly broad, encompassing changes in a trial date occurring before a hearing has even been scheduled. See Shrader, 324 Md. at 467-469, 597 A.2d at 945-46. Thus, to the extent that Chamberlain's argument relates to the six days by which the appellant's scheduling of the initial hearing exceeded the prescribed 30
days, see 16-205.1(f)(5)(i), it is obvious that rescheduling was not unduly extended or inexpedient. Postponement, even as interpreted by Shrader, is not so broad as to encompass the scheduling of a remand hearing. The statute does not, of course, address the issue or, so far as it appears, contemplate the rescheduling of such hearings. And we are not aware of a requirement in any rule that a remand hearing be scheduled consistent with the same criteria as is applicable to the initial administrative hearing.
The focus of section 16-205.1(f)(5) is the initial administrative hearing. Subsection (f)(5)(i) addresses the initial scheduling upon a driver's request. The effect of postponing that hearing is the subject of subsection (f)(5)(ii) and (iii), while the time for complying with a subpoena is the focus of subsection (f)(5)(iv). What happens when the hearing is postponed beyond the 45th day following the issuance of a temporary license is the subject of subsection (f)(5)(v). Finally the requirement that a postponed hearing be expeditiously rescheduled
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|