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Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
Sheila Roy brought this action on behalf of herself and her daughter in May 1986, following a reign of terror beginning in October 1983, during which Milton Glenn relentlessly and violently pursued and abused her. Roy sought damages against Snohomish County, members of its prosecutor's office, the City of Everett and members of its police department, and Glenn's estate. (Glenn had killed himself during his final assault on Roy on October 5, 1984.) The claim against Snohomish County and its prosecutors was dismissed on the grounds of prosecutorial immunity. Petitioners here are the City of Everett, the Everett Chief of Police and certain Everett police officers.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants failed to protect her, which failure constituted negligence, gross negligence, wanton misconduct, and outrage; violated their duties under RCW 10.99.070, the domestic violence act; failed to train and supervise; violated equal protection provisions of the Washington Constitution and RCW 49.60; and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint does not allege any misconduct by the police in the course of an arrest or other, on-the-scene action such as entering the home to break up a fight. Rather, plaintiff claims there was a yearlong pattern by the Everett Police Department of nonenforcement of the law and failure to take adequate steps to protect her from her assailant. The issue here is whether the yearlong pattern of inaction is immunized under RCW 10.99.070. We hold it is not.
Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting they were immune from suit under RCW 10.99.070. The statute provides:
A peace officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of domestic violence brought by any party to the incident.
The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment under the claim of immunity. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court concluded:
o rely on that language [RCW 10.99.070] to completely immunize the defendants . . . would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases. . . . If I am to give substance to the immunity provisions of the statute, I must construe it narrowly because of the wording of the intent section. When RCW 10.99.010 and 10.99.070 are read together, the latter grants immunity only for conduct in the course of an arrest or other on the scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight . . . .
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum Decision), at 2-3. The court further ruled that:
Defendant City and police officers' immunity under RCW 10.99.070, construed in light of the entire Domestic Violence Act, is limited to conduct in the course of an arrest or other on-the-scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight. Since Plaintiff Roy's suit is not based on such conduct, it is not barred by the immunity section of the domestic violence law, and therefore defendant's motion on that issue is denied.
Order on Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), at 1. The court also rejected the defendants' claim that qualified immunity precluded their liability for Roy's claims because " aterial issues of fact exist as to whether defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable . . . ". Order, a
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