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Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
359, but that more limited immunity applies to police conduct in situations involving domestic violence is illogical and inconsistent. No rule of law or principle supports the conclusion that peace officers owe a greater duty of protection or more rigorous law enforcement to victims of domestic violence than to other citizen victims of violence. Yet that is the duty that the majority's more limited immunity imposes on peace officers in a domestic violence situation. The majority's application of Guffey violates the Legislature's intent that victims of domestic violence enjoy the same protection that other victims of violence enjoy, "without regard to whether the persons involved are . . . cohabiting . . . ." RCW 10.99.010.
Finally, if the Legislature intended that RCW 10.99.070 protect only actions of peace officers, it would have so stated. The Oregon Legislature, for example, enacted an immunity provision that specifically limits the scope of immunity and shields peace officers from liability only "for making an arrest . . . in good faith", pursuant to the Oregon family abuse act. 1977 Or. Laws, ch. 845, § 9; Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.315. The immunity provision of our domestic violence
act, enacted 2 years after Oregon's law, employs broader language: It immunizes "an arrest . . . or any other action or omission in good faith". RCW 10.99.070. Our Legislature considered the precise language of the immunity provision and explicitly chose to offer immunity not just for arrests made in good faith, but for any action or omission, in good faith, arising out of an incident of domestic violence. Amendments to Proposed Substitute House Bill 438, 46th Legislature (1979), at 4, para. 18. It could have adopted a narrower standard, like that of Oregon, but it rejected more limited immunity.
Because the immunity that RCW 10.99.070 offers is qualified only by the requirement that the officer's action or omission be undertaken in good faith, I would conclude that the trial court erred when it confined the scope of immunity to "an arrest or other on the street action, such as entering a home to break up a fight". Clerk's Papers, at 17-18. Further, I believe that whether the officers in this case acted in good faith is a question which can be determined as a matter of law. Although Roy asserts that the officers "failed to meet industry standards of competence" (Brief of Respondent, at 12) when they did not arrest Glenn on January 6 and when they returned Glenn's gun to him on January 18, concrete evidence of record does not support her allegations or raise a question of material fact. Evidence shows that Officer Campbell did not learn the specifics of Glenn's assault on Roy until after Roy left the residence on January 6. Evidence also shows that Officer Rasmussen acted pursuant to police regulation when he returned Glenn's gun on January 18. There is no evidence that the officers willfully, knowingly violated police procedures in this case.
The scope of qualified good faith immunity available under RCW 10.99.070 encompasses the conduct of the officers in this case. Statutory good faith immunity shields them from liability for the actions or omissions of which Roy complains. The trial court erred when it denied summary judgment in favor of the individual police officers.
Immunity of the Municipal Employer
The "good faith" immunity that peace officers enjoy shields their municipal employer from liability for claims based on the officers' conduct, via the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The defendants contend that the i
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