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Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
r the state and federal constitutions because the majority of the victims of domestic abuse are women. Roy reasons that because the majority of the victims are women a broad grant of immunity effectively will have a discriminatory impact on women: it will deny women access to the court and grant peace officers immunity from liability for tortious conduct against women.
This equal protection argument is flawed for several reasons. Even assuming the accuracy of all of the statistical evidence that Roy and the amici submitted, "statistics alone will not trigger strict scrutiny . . . ." Macias, 100 Wash. 2d at 270. Roy must show discriminatory intent or purpose.
Macias v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra; State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. at 358. There is no evidence that discriminatory intent or purpose motivated the City's broad interpretation of the immunity provision. But see Hynson v. Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
The cases upon which Roy relies do not compel a different result. Neither gender discrimination nor equal protection was at issue in Chambers-Castanes v. King Cy., 100 Wash. 2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 39 A.L.R.4th 671 (1983). Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975) did not involve an expressly granted statutory immunity, a gender based statutory classification, or a facially neutral statute that allegedly had a discriminatory impact on women. Further, the statute in Jenkins denied a class of tort victims any access to the court, while the immunity that RCW 10.99.070 extends to peace officers leaves the courts open to claims which allege that an officer's actions or omissions were performed in bad faith. Finally, the court in Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) did not address a question of statutory immunity that shielded municipal employees or employers, and the plaintiffs in Darrin challenged facially discriminatory regulations, not a facially neutral statute.
Roy and the amici do not demonstrate that an interpretation of RCW 10.99.070 which offers peace officers qualified good faith immunity violates article 1, section 12 of the state constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Roy and the amici next contend that an interpretation of RCW 10.99.070 broader than the trial court's violates article 31, section 1 of the state constitution because, although the immunity provision itself is facially neutral, a broad reading of the statutory language will disparately impact female victims of abuse and perpetuate discriminatory practices. Brief of Respondent, at 41-42; Brief of Amici Curiae, at 13-16. Their arguments and the cases upon which they rely, however, are not persuasive.
Article 31, the Equal Rights Amendment, provides that:
Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.
The ERA's protection goes beyond that of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution and the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution. State v. Brayman, 110 Wash. 2d 183, 200-01, 751 P.2d 294 (1988); Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 871. The ERA forbids discrimination against or special treatment of any person on account of their sex. Darrin v. Gould, supra; Blair v. WSU, 108 Wash. 2d 558, 565, 740 P.2d 1379
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