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Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
act must be construed as a whole, harmonizing all provisions to ensure proper construction.
(Citations omitted.) Similarly, a unanimous court in Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976) stated:
f alternative interpretations are possible, the one that best advances the overall legislative purpose should be adopted. . . . "The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature." Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash. 2d 64, 67, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). Legislative intent is to be determined in the context of the entire statute, interpreted in terms of the statute's general purpose.
Indeed, in In re R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), this court went so far as to state:
In resolving a question of statutory construction, the spirit and intent of the law should prevail over the letter of the law. Furthermore, if an act is subject to two interpretations, that which best advances the legislative purpose should be adopted.
(Citations omitted.)
[3-6] The language of RCW 10.99.070, particularly that portion regarding actions or omissions in good faith by peace officers, is less than a model of clarity. Nonetheless, we fully concur with the observation of the trial court that "to rely on that language to completely immunize the defendants in the instant case would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases." Memorandum Decision, at 2. The trial court properly ordered that:
Defendant City and police officers' immunity under RCW 10.99.070, construed in light of the entire Domestic Violence
Act, is limited to conduct in the course of an arrest or other on-the-scene action such as entering the home to break up a fight.
Order, at 1.
The trial court's decision is in keeping with our statement in PUD 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm'n, 110 Wash. 2d 114, 120, 750 P.2d 1240 (1988) (quoting Roza Irrig. Dist. v. State, 80 Wash. 2d 633, 637-38, 497 P.2d 166 (1972)) that "if [statutory] language is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will carry out and the other defeat the manifest object [of the statute], it should receive the former construction.'" See also Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wash. 2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982) (in order to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, an ambiguous statute "must be read as a whole; intent is not to be determined by a single . . . phrase"). Similarly, in State v. Leech, 114 Wash. 2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990), we unanimously and explicitly rejected a literal interpretation of the words "in furtherance of" in the statute defining first degree arson, holding that a literal interpretation would yield absurd results. Leech, at 708-09. To enact a statute with the stated intent of ensuring enforcement of laws prohibiting domestic violence, but to include within it a blanket grant of immunity for peace officers as to any action or inaction relating to a domestic violence situation, as defendants assert the Legislature did, would be absurd in every sense of the term.
The defendants' reading of RCW 10.99.070 would make a mockery of the Legislature's clearly stated intent "to assure the vict
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