Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
inquiry as the trial court. Atherton Condominium Apartment-Owners Ass'n v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wash. 2d 506, 515, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Atherton Condominium Ass'n, 115 Wash. 2d at 516; CR 56(c). Generally, summary judgment is not appropriate where "good faith" is an issue. Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 461, 716 P.2d 814 (1986); Gwinn v. Church of the Nazarene, 66 Wash. 2d 838, 846,
405 P.2d 602 (1965); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wash. 2d 678, 681-82, 349 P.2d 605 (1960). A bare assertion or conclusory allegation that a party acted in bad faith, however, alone, does not raise a question of fact. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 389-90, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986); Ruffer v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 56 Wash. App. 625, 784 P.2d 1288, review denied, 114 Wash. 2d 1023 (1990). Further, "good faith" does not demand infallible judgment: on the contrary, it encompasses honest and reasonable mistakes. Guffey v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 144, 151, 690 P.2d 1163 (1984). If, after reviewing the concrete evidence presented, reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion, then a question of fact, like good faith, may be determined as a matter of law. See Central Wash. Bank v. Mendelson-Zeller, Inc., 113 Wash. 2d 346, 352, 779 P.2d 697 (1989).
Analysis
The parties dispute the scope of immunity that RCW 10.99.070 grants. The statute provides that:
A peace officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of domestic violence brought by any party to the incident.
The majority correctly states that the question presented is one of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law and our review is de novo. Multicare Med. Ctr. v. State, 114 Wash. 2d 572, 582, 790 P.2d 124 (1990). We adopt that interpretation which best advances the legislative purpose of an act and avoids unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wash. 2d 828, 835, 791 P.2d 897 (1990); Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 928, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
Immunity of Individual Officers
The domestic violence act immunizes peace officers for their acts or omissions arising out of incidents of domestic violence, qualified only by the requirement that the officers act in good faith.
The defendants argue that the plain language of the phrase "any other action or omission" creates a "general and unqualified grant of immunity." Brief of Petitioners, at 13. I agree with the majority that RCW 10.99.070 does not create a blanket grant of immunity. The statutory terms "any" and "omission" derive meaning from the context in which they are employed. These statutory terms should not be interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, particularly where such a distorted interpretation defeats the clearly expressed
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