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Roy v. City of Everett2/6/1992
intent of the Legislature. See Johnson v. Department of Empl. Sec., 112 Wash. 2d 172, 177-78, 769 P.2d 305 (1989); Mercer Island v. Kaltenbach, 60 Wash. 2d 105, 109, 371 P.2d 1009 (1962). The Legislature's purpose when it enacted the domestic violence act was "to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law . . . can provide . . . stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and . . . communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated . . ." simply because it occurs between cohabitants. RCW 10.99.010. See State v. Raines, 55 Wash. App. 459, 465-66, 778 P.2d 538, review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1036 (1990). The comprehensive immunity that defendants advocate vitiates the clear duty that the act imposes on peace officers to enforce the law and offer victims of abuse maximum protection under the law. State v. Raines, supra. I believe that the defendants' interpretation of RCW 10.99.070 may encourage precisely the "differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and of the same crimes occurring between strangers" which the Legislature condemned when it passed the domestic violence act. I therefore agree with the majority and reject the defendants' unqualified interpretation of the immunity provision of RCW 10.99.
The majority correctly rejects defendants' assertion that RCW 10.99.070 offers unqualified immunity to peace officers. It then adopts an interpretation, however, that flagrantly disregards the language of the act and conflicts with the tenor of other decisions of this court concerning peace officer immunity. The majority amends the language
of the immunity provision when it disregards the key word "omission" and the phrase "in good faith".
Viewing the statute as a whole and considering the legislative intent that underlies the act, RCW 10.99.070 clearly grants qualified immunity to peace officers for conduct arising out of incidents of domestic violence. The statute immunizes an "action or omission in good faith " arising out of an incident of domestic violence. The court must give effect to every word and clause of the statute, and may not deem a word or clause inoperative or superfluous unless it is the result of obvious mistake or error. Dennis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 479-80, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987); Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 383, 387-88, 693 P.2d 683 (1985). I therefore would give effect to the word "omission" as well as the clause "in good faith", because there is no evidence that inclusion of the word or phrase is the result of obvious mistake by the Legislature.
The word "omission" expands the scope of immunity, to include more than "an arrest or other on-the-scene action". Conversely, the phrase "in good faith" clearly limits the scope of immunity that the Legislature accords to peace officers under the domestic violence act. The scope of immunity includes actions or omissions of peace officers only if their conduct arises from an alleged incident of domestic violence and only if it is performed in good faith, pursuant to the act.
The conclusion that RCW 10.99.070 extends qualified, "good faith" immunity to peace officers accords with the legislative purpose that underlies the domestic violence act. The purpose of the act is to "recognize the importa
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