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People v. Parker2/7/2003
ned following a proceeding conducted pursuant to CPL 400.27 (1) that defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment (*3)without parole for that crime.
II. Issues Related to the Death Penalty
We first address the challenges raised by defendant to New York's statutory scheme for the death penalty. First, defendant contends that the death penalty statutes (citing Penal Law § 125.27 and CPL 400.27) constitute cruel and unusual punishment and deprived him of due process and equal protection. We conclude, however, that we should not address defendant's general constitutional challenges to the death penalty inasmuch as defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. It is well settled that courts should not address a constitutional issue if the case may be disposed of in any other way (see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 496-497; People v Felix, 58 NY2d 156, 161, appeal dismissed 464 US 802; see also Matter of Beach v Shanley, 62 NY2d 241, 254). According to principles of judicial restraint, constitutional issues should not be decided "'unless their disposition is necessary to the appeal'" (Matter of Clara C. v William L., 96 NY2d 244, 250, quoting People v Carcel, 3 NY2d 327, 330). Here, even if we were to address defendant's general constitutional challenges to the death penalty and decide them in defendant's favor, our decision with respect to those constitutional challenges would not change the ultimate result of defendant's appeal. Thus, we do not address those challenges.
Second, defendant contends that CPL 270.20 (1) (f) is unconstitutional because it permits a "death-qualified" jury - a jury composed of members who are able to consider the death penalty - to determine a capital defendant's guilt or innocence. That contention is without merit, with respect to both the United States and New York Constitutions. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the United States Constitution "does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying' juries in capital cases" (Lockhart v McCree, 476 US 162, 173). The Court of Appeals recently concluded that there is "no State constitutional impediment to CPL 270.20 (1) (f)" (Harris, 98 NY2d at 480) and that " othing in the language of the State's constitutional counterpart of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (NY Const, art I, § 1) or our jurisprudence suggests that defendant is entitled to greater protection here on State constitutional grounds" (id.).
Third, defendant contends that his prosecution was affected by the constitutional infirmity of CPL 220.10 (5) (e) and 220.30 (3) (b) (vii). Those statutory provisions were determined to be unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Hynes v Tomei (92 NY2d 613, 626-627, cert denied 527 US 1015), a case decided after (*4)defendant was convicted and sentenced herein. We disagree with defendant, and conclude that his prosecution was not affected by the constitutional infirmity of those statutes.
Before examining the applicability of the decision in Hynes to this case, it is helpful to examine the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v Jackson (390 US 570, 581-583), upon which the decision of the Court of Appeals in Hynes is based. In Jackson, the Supreme Court struck down the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act (18 USC § 1201 et seq.) on the ground that it needlessly encouraged defendants to plead guilty and to waive the right to a jury trial in order to avoid exposure to the death penalty. Under that provision, a defendant would face the death penalty only if he or she did not plead guilty and instead chose to exercise the right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court determined that " he inevitable e
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