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People v. Parker2/7/2003
Y2d 797), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's challenges for cause with respect to those prospective jurors (see id.).
The contention of defendant that he was "forced" to accept a certain prospective juror is without merit. The record establishes that, in using his last peremptory challenge, defendant had a choice between that prospective juror and another prospective juror, and opted to use the peremptory challenge to exclude the other prospective juror. "A hard choice is not the same as no choice" (United States v Martinez-Salazar, 528 US 304, 315), and thus we cannot conclude that defendant was "forced" to accept the prospective juror at issue. Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying his motions for additional peremptory challenges, which resulted in the seating of that prospective juror, whom defendant describes as an "incompetent juror." We reject defendant's characterization of that prospective juror. Her statements, "taken in context and as a whole, were unequivocal" that she could be impartial (Chambers, 97 NY2d at 419). Defendant also contends that the constitutionality of CPL 270.20 (2) was implicated when he had used all of his peremptory challenges and was forced to choose between two jurors whom he had unsuccessfully challenged for cause. That contention, however, is premised on the factual inaccuracy that defense counsel exercised his last peremptory challenge with respect to prospective juror L. when in fact the record establishes that defendant exercised his last peremptory challenge with respect to prospective juror C.
B. The People's Challenges for Cause
Defendant contends that the court erred in granting several of the People's challenges for cause and that he was thereby deprived of his right to a fair, impartial, and representative jury. We reject that contention. The court properly granted the People's challenge for cause with respect to four prospective jurors who stated that, although there may be cases in which the death penalty would be warranted, they would have difficulty taking an active role in imposing it (see CPL 270.20 ; see also Harris, 98 NY2d at 484-485).
The court also properly granted the People's challenge for cause (*8)with respect to a prospective juror who failed to disclose a prior conviction of driving while intoxicated and who, upon further questioning, stated that she believed that law enforcement officers planted illegal drugs in her vehicle at the time. It was within the court's discretion to determine that the state of mind of that prospective juror would likely preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict (see CPL 270.20 ; see also People v Webb, 285 AD2d 659, 660, lv denied 97 NY2d 689; People v Traylor, 283 AD2d 1013, lv denied 96 NY2d 869; see generally People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 363).
Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the People's challenge for cause with respect to a prospective juror who initially stated that she did not agree with the death penalty and would not impose it in this case owing to her moral sense, but within the course of questioning, equivocated on that position. It was within the court's discretion to determine that the prospective juror's promise to be impartial was not credible (see generally Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363). We further conclude that the court properly granted the People's challenge for cause pursuant to CPL 270.20 (1) (b) with respect to a prospective juror who stated that he could not promise that the possibility of the punishment of death would not influence his decision with respect to defendant's guilt or innocence.
Defendant's contentions concerning the r
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