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Eaton v. Commonwealth9/21/1990
f this policy was to allow a defendant to request counsel "in any manner" and at any stage of the proceeding. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The standard adopted by the majority today complies with neither the rationale, nor the language, of the Supreme Court.
In support of their standard, the majority cites one phrase from Edwards v. Arizona; a phrase in which the Supreme Court declared that Miranda does not allow the police to continue a custodial interrogation if the defendant "has clearly asserted his right to counsel." 451 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). This phrase provides tenuous support at most for the majority's position.
Edwards involved the waiver of a constitutional right, not the invocation of that right. There was no question as to whether or not the defendant wished to have an attorney present. Furthermore, in discussing the waiver issue, the Court noted that in some jurisdictions waiver was possible, "when the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (CA5 1979) (en banc). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (CA5 1979)." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486, n.9.
When specifically addressing the invocation of counsel issue, the Supreme Court did comment in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738 (1969), that the statement, "I think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more, might be sufficient to invoke the defendant's right to counsel under the "in any manner" language of Miranda, but fell short of the test under Escobedo v. Illinois, 379 U.S. 487 (1964), which controlled the case. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 738. Three years after Edwards, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91 (1984), acknowledged that it had not established a standard for determining the consequences of an equivocal request for counsel, and determined that it need not resolve the issue in that case.
Based on these cases, one must take a step of significant proportions to maintain that the Court's use of the phrase "clearly asserted" in Edwards, established or even supports the standard adopted by the majority today.
In addition to placing an improper burden on the defendant, the majority's exacting test also places an unnecessary burden on the police officer. The intent of the defendant is now to be measured through the perspective of the interrogating officer, the very person who has a substantial interest in the fruits of the interrogation. What may seem clear and unequivocal to one police officer may appear ambiguous and equivocal to another. Furthermore, his judgment will continually be subject to review by the courts. Courts, like police officers, may well arrive at divergent conclusions regarding the import of a suspect's references to an attorney. The rule adopted by the Court today undercuts the rationale of Miranda and the preference expressed by the Supreme Court for establishing bright-line rules which will provide law enforcement officers with appropriate guides for responses to particular actions.
In my opinion, the record in this case supports a finding that Eaton intended to request counsel, but at a minimum, exemplifies the practical and legal dangers inherent in the majority's rule requiring an unambiguous request for counsel.
Eaton, a functional illiterate with an I.Q. between 84 and 94, was interrogated on his release from the hospital after three days of treatment for a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. About an hour before the interrogation began, Officers Dudley and Hottinger met with two state troopers and the Commonwealth's attorneys for the City of Salem and the County of Rockbridge. At this meeting, strategy for the interrogation
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