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Eaton v. Commonwealth9/21/1990
on's counsel posed several lengthy questions, essentially asking whether she would "automatically" impose the death penalty if Eaton were proved guilty. Initially, Daines answered, "Yes." When the trial court asked her if she meant to say "automatically," Daines emphatically stated: "I would not automatically" impose the death penalty.
Eaton contends that Juror Daines was clearly "death prone." On the contrary, the record indicates that she would not
"automatically" impose the death sentence. Her error was in responding "yes" to a lengthy and confusing question posed by Eaton's counsel which contained the word "automatically." When the question was posed in clear and unambiguous terms by the trial court, the juror responded that she would abide by the trial court's instructions. There was no error in seating juror Daines.
4. Donald S. Cherry
Eaton contends that venireman Donald S. Cherry should have been excused for cause because Cherry stated that he "would lean towards" the death penalty if Eaton were convicted of capital murder. However, taking Cherry's voir dire as a whole, the record clearly shows that he would give evidence in mitigation the same weight as evidence in aggravation. Based on the record, we agree with the trial court that Cherry was not "death prone."
B. Questions Concerning Parole Eligibility
The defense proposed a voir dire question which informed the jury that Eaton would be ineligible for parole by reason of sentences previously imposed upon him for his other murders. The question also asked the jurors whether they could consider a sentence "less than death" if they were instructed not to concern themselves with the possibility of parole or of Eaton's ultimate return to society. The court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to the question and Eaton assigns error to that ruling.
Information regarding parole eligibility is not relevant evidence to be considered by the jury. Spencer IV, 240 Va. at 85, 393 S.E.2d at 613; Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 351, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S. Ct. 1797
(1990); Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 178-80, 360 S.E.2d 361, 367-68 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 418-19, 329 S.E.2d 815, 828, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 888 (1985). Indeed, "the jury has no right to be advised of post-sentencing events." Id. at 432, 329 S.E.2d at 836. The Supreme Court has expressly left this question to be determined by the States, as a matter of state law. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983). Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing Eaton's proposed voir dire question.
VI. SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENTS TO POLICE
Contending that they were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Eaton assigns error to the court's refusal to suppress the statements he made to the police on February 24 and February 26. Eaton did not testify at the October 30 hearing on his motion to suppress. The only witnesses to his statements were the two police officers, Dudley and Hottinger, who interviewed him on February 24 and February 26.
Although the testimony of the two officers differed in some respects, they both testified that Eaton received full Miranda warnings before, and several times during, his interrogat
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