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Eaton v. Commonwealth9/21/1990
ect to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
451 U.S. at 484-85 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Our inquiry, therefore, must focus upon the question whether Eaton "invoked his right to have counsel present" or "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel."
We agree with the trial court that Eaton's utterances concerning his right to counsel were equivocal. Authorities in other jurisdictions have adopted differing standards with respect to the specificity with which a request for counsel must be expressed.
Some courts require a clear and unambiguous request, some prohibit all further questioning when the subject of counsel is mentioned in any way, while others permit further questioning only for the purpose of resolving the ambiguity. The United States Supreme Court has not expressly decided the question, Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1984), but has expressed a preference for "bright-line rules" for the guidance of the police who must conduct custodial interrogatories. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
The trial court, relying on Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888 (1985) and Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), concluded that the standard prevailing in Virginia is that a request for counsel must be "unambiguous and unequivocal" in order to trigger the Edwards rule. We distinguished the facts in Bunch from those in Edwards by pointing out that "where Edwards involved an unequivocal statement by the accused that he wanted counsel, Bunch's statement... was couched in ambiguous terms to the effect that he mat want to talk to a lawyer." Bunch, 225 Va. at 433, 304 S.E.2d at 276 (emphasis in original). We noted a further distinction: in Edwards, the defendant was told that he had to talk to the police. Bunch, like Eaton, was told that he need not do so. Id.
The circumstances in Poyner were remarkably close to those of the present case. After police officers had given Poyner Miranda warnings, they summarized the information in their possession linking Poyner with one of the murders charged against him. At that point, Poyner asked, "Didn't you say I have the right to an attorney?" The officers said, "Yes." Citing Bunch, we held that the defendant's statement was not a request for counsel. "At most, it sought to clarify one of the rights of which he had already been advised." Poyner, 229 Va. at 410, 329 S.E.2d at 823. The trial court's view that we have required a clear request for counsel was, therefore, well-founded.
[18-19] We share the U.S. Supreme Court's preference for "bright-line" rules for the guidance of those who must conduct and evaluate custodial interrogations. In further explication of the views expressed in Bunch and Poyner, we hold that the Edwards rule is invoked, and that custodial interrogation must cease, when the accused, having received Miranda warnings and having begun to respond to the questions of the authorities, "has clearly
asserted his right to counsel," Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). Because Eaton's words and conduct fell short of that standard, we hold that he failed to invoke his right to counsel and that the Edwards rule did not come into pl
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