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State v. Himuro10/6/1988
t may be determined from '. . . a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.'" Id. We are also mindful that "our primary duty . . . in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature which, in the absence of a clearly contrary expression is conclusively obtained by the language of the statute itself." Boulton v. Boulton , 69 Haw. , , 730 P.2d 338, 339 (1986).
HRS Chapter 286 was enacted to establish a traffic safety program out of "grave concern" over death and personal injury , damage to property, and other losses suffered on account of highway traffic accidents. Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 23, in 1967 Senate Journal, at 824. The purpose of requiring a prompt hearing under the "implied consent" provisions of Chapter 286 is not specified in the legislative history. It appears clear, however, that the legislature's object was to provide a procedure for the prompt revocation of an arrested person's driver's license upon refusal
to submit to sobriety testing. The license revocation procedure contributes towards the overall goal of preventing traffic accidents by removing intoxicated drivers from the highways as expeditiously as possible. In fact, as originally enacted, the law mandated a hearing within ten days, but was amended in 1973 to extend the time period to twenty days due to "administrative problems." Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 508, in 1973 House Journal, at 974. The amendment retained the mandatory language and reaffirmed the statutory requirement that hearings be held within a specified time.
In enacting the "implied consent" law, the legislature's purpose was to benefit the public interest in keeping our highways safe. We are convinced that a directory rather than a mandatory reading of the twenty day hearing requirement would be contrary to this intent. We acknowledge that the consequences of a mandatory construction are harsh to the state in the instant case, since the Appellee will avoid the sanctions of the statute simply because the hearing was held one day late. The consequences of a directory reading, however, would confound the statutory scheme by allowing the time period for hearings on license revocations to be delayed beyond the twenty days prescribed by the legislature. This result is clearly contrary to the plain language of the statute as well as its underlying purpose and intent.
We hold that HRS § 286-156's requirement of a hearing within twenty days is, as its plain language indicates, mandatory. The trial court's ruling dismissing the case and vacating its earlier finding of guilty for violation of § 286-156 is affirmed.
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