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People v. Epps6/27/1986
hell), testified to actually having seen appellant standing in an open window of the victim's home during the time the crime must have been occurring. Mitchell even provided testimony that the noise emanating from the house stopped during the times appellant seemed to be stationary, framed by the open window, staring outside.
Various items of personal property identified by relatives as belonging to the victim were found in a jacket shed by appellant during his attempted flight from the deputies. Shoe prints near the victim's home matched the soles of the shoes worn by appellant. Appellant's hands, as well as currency in his possession, were stained with blood which matched the blood type of the victim and was inconsistent with appellant's own blood type. In short, the physical evidence and eyewitness testimony overwhelmingly established appellant as the perpetrator of this brutal and senseless murder.
The defense sought through testimony of appellant, appellant's associates and medical experts to establish a pattern of chronic and contemporaneous drug and alcohol use which caused a blackout during the time in question and a mental state incapable of formulating specific intent.
While never disputing the fact that appellant had consumed alcohol and drugs immediately prior to the crime, the prosecution obviously did not concede the issue of intent. Therefore, the ability to present evidence with respect to the blood and/or urine analysis was of considerable importance to the appellant's position. But for the actions of the prosecution and its treatment of physical evidence critical to the defense of this case, affirmation of this judgment would be simple. This court nonetheless affirms the judgment by applying principles of federal law.
I.
Was Appellant Denied Due Process of Law by the State's Failure to Preserve Potentially Favorable Evidence and the Trial Court's Failure to Impose an Appropriate Sanction?
There has evolved in recent years a body of case law which has been described as creating a "'constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.'" (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 419, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532].) There is probably no concise definition of this right and the courts, state and federal, have employed a case-by-case analysis. To elaborate the history and detail the many cases at this point would probably confuse rather than clarify the problem. Succinctly put, the inquiry is: "What duty does the state have in regard to the collection, retention, and distribution of evidence which might help the accused?" A natural corollary to this inquiry is: "What is the sanction which should be imposed on the state for violation of this duty?" At this point the court notes that there are many logical component parts to this puzzle. It is clear that the evidence involved may be human, in the form of witnesses, or inanimate, in the form of tangible physical evidence commonly associated with crime, i.e., blood, hair, tissue, semen, fingerprints, etc., etc. This opinion will only deal with inanimate physical evidence. It should be noted, however, that earlier opinions, such as Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194], had little trouble expanding due process considerations with facts which showed a deliberate prosecution act or omission resulting in exculpatory evidence being withheld from the accused.
In the area of the state's duty with respect to physical evidence potentially useful to the accused, the leading cases have dealt with blood alcohol levels obtained from the blood, breath or urine of accused drunk drivers. Fundamentally this court notes the difference between
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