 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Epps6/27/1986
its standard procedures for analysis of the blood sample. However, this standard procedure ultimately consumed the entire sample. It is possible that the prosecution did not ask and was not told of the gradual attrition of the blood sample. Perhaps the prosecution was negligent in failing to inquire as to the amount of blood actually needed for its standard tests and ignorant of the actual testing processes, including the eventuality of repeated testing. Because the practice and procedure in Tulare County seem to have a reputation in the community for integrity, and because appellant's trial counsel stated on the record, "Your Honor, I don't think its any deliberate act on Miss Paden's part," this court concludes that the trial court was correct in its ruling that the state was acting in good faith in following its normal procedures, and that there was no conscious effort to suppress evidence beneficial to the defense.
In deciding this case and mindful of the above, this court looks to the prevailing authority in this area. As often cited in both sides' briefs and arguments, the case of People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 641 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361] represents this state's highest court's definitive statement of the duty to preserve blood samples obtained by the police in criminal investigations. The standard enumerated in Hitch, and expanded by its progeny, is (1) that the evidence must have been material, (2) the authorities must have had knowledge of the potential materiality of the evidence, and (3) the authorities must have destroyed the evidence or failed to follow "rigorous and systematic procedures" to preserve the evidence. (People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at pp. 652-653.)
The burden articulated in Hitch and imposed on the prosecution to establish, enforce and attempt in good faith to adhere to "rigorous and systematic procedures" designed to preserve the evidence has been applied to urine samples (People v. Moore (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 215 [193 Cal. Rptr. 404, 666 P.2d 419]) and semen samples (People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 169 [161 Cal. Rptr. 299, 604 P.2d 1051]). The test of materiality that appellant must preliminarily satisfy merely requires a showing that there is "'a reasonable possibility that the evidence, if preserved, would have constituted favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. [Citation omitted.]'" (People v. Moore, supra, 34 Cal. 3d at p. 220; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at p. 649; People v. Newsome (1982) 136 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 [186 Cal. Rptr. 676].) The Supreme Court in Moore further went on to state that the burden of the defense is satisfied when the "evidence by its nature could reasonably be used to impeach the credibility of the prosecution witness' testimony regarding the evidence." (34 Cal. 3d at p. 220.)
Appellant and respondent both cite the analogous federal rule as set forth in California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at pages 488-489 [81
L.Ed.2d at p. 422, 104 S.Ct. at p. 2534]: "Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. [Fn. omitted.] To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, . . ., evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant wo
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|