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STATE v. RYNE G5/22/1986
Ryne G. (Ryne) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Penobscot County) denying his appeal from adjudications of the District Court (Bangor), sitting as the juvenile court, finding him guilty of one count of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp. 1983-1984), and two counts of vehicular manslaughter (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203 (Pamph. 1982). On appeal he contends that the erred in 1) denying his motion to suppress the results of a breath test taken pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 2241-G(2)(B) (Supp. 1983-1984); 2) admitting a statement, made by a witness prior to the automobile accident, as to Ryne's inability to drive; 3) excluding Ryne's statement to the investigating officer that the accident occurred because a passenger had placed her foot on the accelerator; and 4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal of the manslaughter offenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
I.
Upon the evidence before it, the juvenile court would have been warranted in finding that on the evening of December 27, 1983, seventeen-year-old Ryne drove three friends to the D.A.V. Hall on outer Essex Street in Bangor, where a group of young people had gathered to decorate the hall for a holiday party. On the way, one of the passengers purchased a case of beer. Ryne consumed six or seven twelve-ounce beers during the evening.
At about midnight, Ryne, with four others, left the hall in Ryne's station wagon to return on Essex Street toward downtown Bangor. Ryne knew that the street was icy. Prior to the accident, the car was traveling approximately forty-five miles per hour.
The Bangor police were called to the accident at 12:22 a.m. Officer Robert Welch, responding to the call, found that the station wagon had hit a pole and had sustained extensive damage. While other officers attended to the four passengers who were still inside the car, Officer Welch spoke to bystanders and to Ryne. Ryne stated he had been operating the station wagon, and at the officer's request, produced his operator's license. Officer Welch observed that Ryne's eyes appeared glassy and he detected an odor, although not a strong one, of an intoxicating beverage on Ryne's breath. Based on his observations, the officer concluded that Ryne's blood alcohol was above .02%. Therefore, pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 2241-G(2)(B), he asked him to go to the police station to take a blood or breath test.
At the station, after Officer Welch read to Ryne the warnings provided in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the implied consent provision applicable to the ".02 Law," Ryne chose to take a breath test. The test yielded a blood-alcohol content of .165%. Officer Welch took Ryne back to the accident Officer Welch then returned Ryne to the police station where he was placed under arrest, booked, and released to the custody of his father.
Ryne seasonably moved to suppress the results of the breath test. At the suppression hearing, the investigating officer testified that he had felt he had probable cause to believe that the defendant had been operating with greater than .02% blood-alcohol level. The juvenile court denied the motion. After trial, the court found that Ryne had committed the juvenile offenses of operating under the influence and vehicular manslaughter. The Superior Court denied Ryne's appeal from the juvenile court adjudications. This appeal followed.
II.
In support of his contention that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress, Ryne first argues that the legislature never intended that the results of a blood-alcohol test obtained pursuant to 29 M
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