Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles2/7/1983
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
S.F. No. 24450
1983.CA.41105 ; 33 Cal. 3d 392; 657 P.2d 383; 188 Cal. Rptr. 891
February 7, 1983
SHARON N. BERLINGHIERI, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
Superior Court of Sacramento County, No. 295167, R. Bryan Jamar, Judge.
Douglas Earl Kirkman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Richard D. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, and Susan P. Underwood, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Opinion by Richardson, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court. Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Newsom, J., and Franson, J., concurred.
Richardson
We establish herein that the "independent judgment" standard (see e.g., Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143 [93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242]) should be used in the judicial review of administrative decisions of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) which suspend a driver's license under Vehicle Code section 13353 (the so-called "implied consent" law; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated).
On May 15, 1980, plaintiff, a driver/sales person for a business firm, was arrested in Sacramento County for driving under the influence of alcohol (former § 23102, subd. (a); see present § 23152) and for resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148). Just prior to her arrest, one of her tires blew out, causing her momentarily to lose control of her car, although the vehicle did not collide with any other object, and no injuries were sustained. Plaintiff's apparent erratic driving was reported to the police and upon arriving at the scene the arresting officer directed plaintiff to perform various sobriety tests. (Plaintiff admitted that she had consumed two beers earlier in the day.) The officer's evaluation of plaintiff's performance of these tests, as poor or failing, was contradicted by plaintiff and two independent witnesses.
The original charges against plaintiff were dismissed after she pleaded guilty to one count of reckless driving. (§ 23103.) Soon thereafter, plaintiff received notice that her driver's license would be suspended for six months, effective June 19, 1980, for an alleged violation of section 13353. After a formal hearing the DMV found that (1) the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that plaintiff had been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (2) she was lawfully arrested, (3) at the scene of the arrest she was properly advised that her driving privileges would be suspended if she refused to submit to a blood alcohol test and (4) she failed to submit to any of the prescribed tests.
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court seeking judicial review of the DMV's decision on the ground that the DMV's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. The trial court issued an alternative writ of mandate, set a hearing date and stayed enforcement of the license revocation pending a ruling on the petition.
The trial court thereafter rejected petitioner's request that the "independent judgment" standard of review be applied and, using
Page 1 2 3 4 5 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|