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City of Bellingham v. Schampera10/20/1960
October 1, 1958, John David Schampera was charged in the municipal court of Bellingham with a violation of § 143 of ordinance No. 5777, as amended by ordinance No. 6952, prohibiting the driving of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was convicted, and appealed to the superior court where he had a trial de novo. He was again convicted and sentenced to ninety days in the county jail (fifty days of which were suspended), fined one hundred dollars, and his motor vehicle operator's license suspended for a period of six months.
He appeals to this court and challenges the validity of the Bellingham ordinance under which he was charged and tried. Basically, his contentions are three:
1. The state of Washington by RCW 46.56.010 (a part of the Washington Motor Vehicle Act), making it
". . . unlawful for any person who is under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor . . . to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon the public highways."
has precluded Bellingham, or any other city in Washington, from passing ordinances directed against the same offense.
2. If Bellingham can enact such legislation, it cannot, as a penalty for its violation, suspend the license of a motor vehicle operator inasmuch as the state has pre-empted the field of the issuance, regulation, and suspension of motor vehicle operators' licenses; and it is, further, not within the maximum penalty provisions allowed to be imposed by first class cities under RCW 35.22.470.
3. If Bellingham can enact such legislation, the particular ordinance now before the court is invalid because the maximum fine and prison term, which it prescribes for the violation of the ordinance, exceed the maximum fine and prison term allowed to be imposed by first class cities under RCW 35.22.470.
We disagree with the contention that Washington cities can not, by ordinance, prohibit driving within their limits by persons under the influence of, or affected by the use of, intoxicating liquor.
We agree that no Washington city can prescribe, as a penalty for a violation of its ordinances, the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license.
We agree that the city of Bellingham can not impose penalties in excess of those provided by RCW 35.22.470, but we do not agree that this necessarily invalidates the ordinance; and hold that since the penalties of fine and imprisonment which were imposed, were within the limits which the city could impose, they will be affirmed.
We will consider these contentions and amplify our answers thereto under three subheads.
Re: Contention that there has been a pre-emption by the state of the prohibition and punishment of the offense of driving on highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
We have recognized, in numerous cases involving
various types of offenses, the right of a city to enact ordinances prohibiting and punishing the same acts which constitute an offense under state laws so long as the city ordinance does not conflict with the general laws of the state, or the state enactment does not show upon its face that it was intended to be exclusive. Seattle v. Hewetson (1917), 95 Wash. 612, 164 P. 234 (prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor); Allen v. Bellingham (1917), 95 Wash. 12, 163 P. 18 (regulating jitney busses); Seattle v. MacDonald (1907), 47 Wash. 298, 91 P. 952, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49 (prohibiting gambling); Bellingham v.
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