 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
City of Bellingham v. Schampera10/20/1960
h Whatcom county uses the county jail for the detention of its prisoners (as is permissible, see RCW 36.63.150-.160), the trial court's designation of the county jail as the place of confinement was correct.
Not knowing the reason for the designation of the county jail in the sentence, we do not feel justified in directing a change in the place of confinement; and we, therefore, remand this case to the superior court with instructions to delete any reference to the suspension of the defendant's motor vehicle operator's license from the judgment and sentence; and to make a change in the place of imprisonment, if there is a city jail in Bellingham.
While we affirm the conviction and the penalty imposed of fine and imprisonment, the appellant, having prevailed in substantial part on this appeal, will recover his costs against the city of Bellingham.
Disposition
Affirmed as modified.
Mallery, J. (dissenting)
The city's motive in passing a drunken-driving ordinance identical with state law was
to enable it to try drunken-driving cases committed within the city in the city police court rather than in a justice court and, thus, keep the fines collected for such offenses.
The majority opinion permits the city to achieve this purpose, but to do so it had to approve the bargain rates which the ordinance gives to defendants whose offenses are committed within the city. The rule of this case would be a revenue measure had it been enacted by the legislature, as it should have been, because it relates to sources of city revenue which are all too scarce these days. Assuming that the cities ought to be allowed to keep the fines derived from drunken-driving cases within the city, it is still the prerogative of the legislature to allocate such fines to them. This court can accomplish such a purpose only by striking down the constitutional right relating to equality of persons before the law.
State law requires the revocation of drivers' licenses regardless of whether the offense of drunken driving is committed in or out of a city. The fact that the appellant committed his offense in a city and was charged in a municipal court with a violation of a city ordinance is, therefore, no reason for his keeping his driver's license, as in this case.
State law, RCW 46.56.010, prescribed penalties for drunken driving, which are augmented for the second and subsequent convictions of the offense. There is a maximum penalty of one thousand dollars and a year in the county jail. RCW 46.08.190 (Laws of 1955, chapter 393, § 4, p. 1702) provides:
"Every justice of the peace and police court judge shall have concurrent jurisdiction with superior court judges of the state for all violations of the provisions of this title and may impose any punishment provided therefor." (Italics mine.)
The effect of this provision is that an enlarged jurisdiction limited to offenses against the state motor vehicle act is conferred upon justices of the peace and police judges. The enlarged jurisdiction, however, does not apply to the same offense when charged as violations of city ordinances. The fact is that penalties which first-class cities can impose
for violation of city ordinances are considerably less than those pertaining to the state motor vehicle act and are, of course, governed by general law.
RCW 35.22.280 provides:
"Any city of the first class shall have power
". . .
"(36) To provide for the punishment of all disorderly conduct, and of all practices dangerous
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Washington DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|