State v. Willard12/15/1954
of evidence and in which defendant complained in this respect that while he was in jail, specimens of his blood and urine were taken for chemical analysis to determine the presence or absence of alcohol and morphine in his system, and contended that in this way he was compelled to give evidence against himself in violation of the constitutional inhibition against compulsory self-incrimination. N.C. Const., Art. I, Sec. 11. In connection therewith, this Court, in opinion by Stacy, C.J., worte as follows: "The record fails to disclose any compulsion on the part of the officers in obtaining specimens of the defendant's blood and urine. The exceptions are therefore feckless. S. v. Eccles, 205 N.C. 825, 172 S.E. 415. They are not sustained. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that physical facts discovered by witnesses on information furnished by the defendant may be given in evidence, even where knowledge of such facts is obtained in a privileged manner, S. v. Garrett, 71 N.C. 85 (examination by physician), by force, S. v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646 (compelling accused to put his shoe in track), by intimidation, duress, etc. Factual information thus brought to light is competent evidence, though the declarations of the accused made at the time, if obtained by improper influence, are to be excluded. S. v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E. 2d 265."
To like effect in principle are S. v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, opinion by Ervin, J., and S. v. Grayson 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387, opinion by Parker, J.
Therefore, the expert testimony as to the results of test of defendant's blood was admissible on the trial of this case on a charge of driving a
motor vehicle upon the public highways within the State while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. G.S. 20-138.
Moreover, it is not amiss to note that in this State a lay witness is competent to testify whether or not in his opinion a person was under the influence of an intoxicant on a given occasion on which he observed him. See S. v. Leak, 156 N.C. 643, 72 S.E. 567; S. v. Jessup, 182 N.C. 771, 111 S.E. 523; S. v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 138 S.E. 8; S. v. Dills, 204 N.C. 33, 167 S.E. 459; S. v. Harris, 209 N.C. 579, 183 S.E. 740; S. v. Dawson, 228 N.C. 85, 44 S.E.2d 527; S. v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763.
And as to when a person is under the influence of an intoxicant, see definition in S. v. Carroll, 226 N.C. 237, 37 S.E.2d 688.
In the light of these cases, there is in the present case abundant evidence, without any of testimony as to results of the blood test, to support the verdict and judgment pursuant thereto.
Now as to the second question: Defendant contends that the remark of the Solicitor is improper and prejudicial under the principles applied in S. v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E.2d 542; Cuthrell v. Greene, 229 N.C. 475, 50 S.E.2d 525; and S. v. Smith, 240 N.C. 631, 83 S.E.2d 656. In the absence of the factual setting of the remark, it is not made to appear that it was an abuse of fair debate and prejudicial. Nor does the fact that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury in respect to it throw light upon the situation.
For reasons stated, there is in the judgment from which appeal is taken
No error.
Disposition
No error.
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