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STATE v. IOWA DIST. COURT8/19/1987
Section 7 of House File 2472, enacted by the legislature in 1984, in relevant part removed from judicial magistrates jurisdiction over first offense violations of Iowa Code section 321.281 (1983), operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or drugged. District court, the Honorable Newt Draheim presiding, held this provision unconstitutional, concluding it violated the single subject, sufficiency of title provision of the Iowa Constitution. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 29. We affirm.
House File 2472 became effective July 1, 1984. In section 7 the legislature struck that portion of Iowa Code section 602.6405 (Supp. 1983) that provided "[magistrates] . . . have jurisdiction of first offense violations of section 321.281 but only to the extent that they may approve trial informations, conduct arraignments, accept guilty pleas if the defendant is represented by legal counsel, sentence those pleading guilty and make appropriate orders authorized by section 321.283." 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1275, § 7.
In 1986 the State requested Magistrate Donald Winkler to approve a trial information in a prosecution for first offense driving while intoxicated. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 5(4). The magistrate refused to approve the trial information on the ground he no longer had jurisdiction to do so.
The State then initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging the magistrate did have the requisite jurisdiction because section 7 of the 1984 act, to the extent it removed magistrates' jurisdiction over section 321.281 violations, was unconstitutional under article III, section 29, of the Iowa Constitution.
By agreement, the case was submitted on the State's pleadings. The State presented no evidence and Magistrate Winkler filed no answer.
District court declared unconstitutional that portion of section 7 that removed magistrates' [410 NW2d Page 686]
jurisdiction to hear section 321.281 violations.
Magistrate Winkler's appeal is grounded on the requirements imposed on all legislation by article III, section 29, of the Iowa Constitution. This section provides:
Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.
Iowa Const. art. III, § 29. We recently pointed out " his provision has two distinct yet inseparable components: the single subject and the title requirements." Western Int'l & Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Iowa 1986); see also Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transp., 265 N.W.2d 151, 152-53 (Iowa 1978).
These two requirements serve several purposes. The single subject requirement is primarily intended to prevent "logrolling." Western Int'l, 396 N.W.2d at 364. Logrolling occurs when a provision unrelated to the core of a bill and not itself capable of obtaining majority support is tied to a popular bill having majority support. Logrolling also occurs when several matters, none of which individually has majority support, are joined in one bill and passage procured by combining the minority in favor of each into a majority willing to enact them all. See Motor Club of Iowa, 265 N.W.2d at 152; Long v. Board of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 1284, 142 N.W.2d 378, 382 (1966).
The single subject limitation of article III, section 29, also facilitates an orderly legislative process. Western Int'l, 396 N.W.2d at 364. As we wrote in Long: "By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues presented by each
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