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State v. Biegenwald3/5/1987
he factor. There is no purpose in explaining to the jury why this first portion of the statute is irrelevant for its purposes. Mentioning it can only cause confusion.
After quoting the statute, the court continued by noting that
although in a certain sense every murder may be viewed as vile, horrible or inhuman, that doesn't mean that there is an automatic aggravating factor in every case of murder. The Legislature had something more in mind by making that an aggravating factor. What is necessary to exist is that the attack by the defendant on Anna Olesiewicz, the victim, involved either torture or conduct indicating a depraved mind or that the attack was so savagely outrageously cruel or violent, that the adjectives wantonly, vile or horrible or inhuman are justified.
That was the entirety of the court's instructions on this aggravating factor in its main charge. The jury, quite predictably, after deliberating a very short time, returned to the courtroom with the request that the court "re-explain Part Two of the aggravating factors, clearer interpretation, because commas are confusing." The jury was obviously referring to aggravating factor c(4)(c). What follows is the colloquy between the court and the jury:
THE COURT: The question you sent out is this: Re-explain part two of the aggravating factors, clearer interpretation, because commas are confusing.
I gather that you're looking at number two on that verdict sheet?
The commas were put in there by the Legislature.
I just want you to know that.
That's the way the Legislature defined it and gave it to you in the legislative language.
In what sense are the commas, it's all in the disjunctive.
The word "or" is in there, that murder was outrageously wanton or vile or horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim.
That's I think what you can interpolate under English Grammar for the commas, is that what was the heart of the problem may be you can give me --
THE FORELADY: The question also was, does the torture, the depravity of mind and aggravated battery, do any one of those three things have to apply?
That's the point.
THE COURT: Any one of the three?
THE FORELADY: Yes.
THE COURT: If it involved either torture or depravity of mind or aggravated battery is that -- I think that's a correct English reading of what the legislature wrote.
It's in the disjunctive.
As I say, any one of those.
THE FORELADY: O.K.
THE COURT: If it's still confusing, try to extract what is the heart of the confusion, and to put it to me in a definite question.
THE FORELADY: O.K.
It is obvious that this jury knew only that which a reasonably intelligent person would gather from reading this part of the statute, and that, decidedly, is not enough to guide anyone's discretion in this decision. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 406-07 (1980). The total impact of the trial court's charge in this regard was to leave the jury with this portion of the statute unexplained. As we stated in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 198-199, Section c(4)(c) standing alone completely fails to channel the jury's discretion and is impermissibly vague.
What was needed was a relatively simple charge that directed the jury to consider only Section c(4)(c) of the statute as we construe that section in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J.
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