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State v. Olaya3/5/1987
are v. Prouse, the Court held that:
xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the * * * States from developing methods for spot checks that involve loss intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. We hold only that
persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.
Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401 (footnote omitted). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979).
Delaware v. Prouse and the cases that have applied it prohibit unbridled discretion on the part of police officers in conducting their stops, but the facts in this case are distinguishable. Officers Toler and Wallace conducted a permissible-type roadblock designed to stop every vehicle on the highway, except commercial carriers. Moreover, the officers' conduct had explicit and neutral limitation. The record discloses that they stopped all private vehicles for the purpose of checking license, registrations, and proof of insurance.
Defendant relies heavily on cases addressing the unconstitutionality of drunk driving stops where officers in the field acted without specific guidelines set by high-ranking superior officers. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Arizona, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (en banc); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983). In each of these cases, a state supreme court affirmed a trial court's decision that a roadblock violated fourth amendment protection. In the first case, the record discussed a "not insubstantial amount of discretionary law enforcement activity," State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Arizona, 136 Ariz. at 5, 663 P.2d at 996, and in the second, the record failed "to establish sufficient police presence, and adequate lighting and warning to approaching motorists" and did not otherwise "establish lack of arbitrariness and undue delay." See Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. at 144-145, 449 N.E.2d at 353. In this case, however, the trial court ruled against defendant on this issue, and the record supports its conclusion. The roadblock in our case was valid.
Defendant asks us to adopt guidelines for evaluating a roadblock. See State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). We understand the argument to be that such guidelines are necessary to deter pretextual stops. We note that the Kansas Supreme court has developed a three-factor analysis, stated in Brown v. Texas, in addition to identifying a number of factors to be considered in applying the factors. Id. 673 P.2d at 1184-85. See also State v. Superior Court in and for the County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984) (in banc). We agree with the Kansas Supreme Court that, in addition, or as an alternative, minimum uniform standards for the operation of vehicular roadblocks might be advisable.
While this opinion was circulating, another panel of this court considered the validity of a sobriety roadblock. See City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (C
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