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Pendleton v. State3/31/1987
efore, the only way in which the United States could attain exclusive jurisdiction involves an affirmative cession of jurisdiction by the State of Nevada and an affirmative acceptance of jurisdiction by the United States.
[103 Nev. 95, Page 99]
Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). See also, United States v. Cliatta, 580 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, in Nevada, no cession of jurisdiction is effective until it is recorded in the County Recorder's office. NRS 328.110.
Because there is no evidence that Nevada has ever ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the lands in question to the United States, Pendleton's argument must fail. The defendant has the burden of showing the applicability of negative exceptions in jurisdictional statutes. State v. Buckaroo Jack, 30 Nev. 325 (1908); State v. Mendez, 57 Nev. 192, 209, 61 P.2d 300, 305 (1963). Once the state produces evidence that the crime took place in the county, it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that the incident took place on lands over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction. Id. There being no such evidence in the record, we conclude that the courts of this state had jurisdiction to try Pendleton. Pendleton next contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements made to officer Blakeslee. Specifically, he argues that the statements should have been suppressed because they were obtained as a result of custodial interrogation before he was advised of his right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is undisputed that Pendleton was not advised of his right to remain silent prior to speaking with Blakeslee. The question we are presented with, then, is whether the statements were the product of custodial interrogation. We agree with the district judge that the statements were not the product of custodial interrogation.
We note first that there is substantial evidence in the record of the hearing on the motion to support the conclusion of the district judge that the questioning did not amount to "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. "Interrogation" consists of express questioning and other acts designed to elicit incriminating statements. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). Here, Blakeslee testified that his design was to investigate a battery upon the appellant. He was not informed that Pendleton was a DUI suspect. As far as Blakeslee was concerned, at the time of the questioning, he was interviewing a victim, not a suspect. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (where the officers making the "christian burial" speech were attempting to elicit admissions). Blakeslee was attempting to determine if another, Pendleton's attacker, was guilty of a crime. We think that where there is no intent or design to elicit incriminating responses, there is no interrogation
[103 Nev. 95, Page 100]
within the meaning of Miranda. As the Supreme Court noted in Innis, at 301, fn. 5, incriminating responses are those that the prosecution may wish to use at trial. A fortiori, the questions must be such as are designed to elicit statements to be used against the person being questioned, not someone suspected of battering that person. Since Blakeslee was not aware that Pendleton was a potential defendant, he could not have anticipated using the statements against him. We find no error in admitting the statements. Pendleton also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. We agree.
The motion was made upon the grounds of alleged juror misconduct. Counsel for the defense submitted his affidavit to the effect that two jurors had told him that another
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