State v. Grimsley2/4/2003
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
DECISION
. Defendant-appellant, Trena V. Grimsley, appeals the decision of the Franklin County Municipal Court overruling her motion to suppress evidence ultimately leading to her arrest and conviction.
. As a consequence of an early morning traffic stop, appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) ("OMVI"), operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3), operating an unsafe vehicle in violation of R.C. 4513.02, and failure to drive within marked lanes of traffic in violation of R.C. 4511.33. At her arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.
. Soon afterward, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence procured during the traffic stop, claiming, among other things, that the police officer lacked legal justification to stop, detain or arrest appellant absent a warrant. However, at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. In view of the court's ruling, appellant changed her plea to no contest, and the court found her to be guilty on all of the charges. Appellant was ultimately sentenced to three days of imprisonment, fined the sum of $300 plus costs, and suspended from her driving privileges for 180 days. By timely appeal, appellant raises the following single assignment of error:
. "THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR STOPPING THE VEHICLE."
. In presiding over a motion to suppress, the trial court takes on the role of trier of fact, and, as such, it stands in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314; State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96. Consequently, as a reviewing court, we must accept the trial court's factual findings where they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145. Nevertheless, without deference to the trial court's ultimate conclusion, we must independently determine as a matter of law whether that decision represents the application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts. State v. Markin, (2002), 149 Ohio App.3d 274, 2002-Ohio-4326, at .
. It is well established that stopping an automobile, thus temporarily detaining its occupants, constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391. And, it is equally clear that the seizure of a person without the authority of a warrant is per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless an exception applies. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507. One such exception is commonly known as an investigative or Terry stop. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
. Applicable to automobile seizures, the Terry exception permits a law enforcement officer to stop an individual if the officer, based upon specific and articulable facts, has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry, supra; Delaware, supra, at 654. In determining the propriety of an investigative stop, "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account." United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690; State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177, paragraph one of the syllabus. Based on the foregoing, this court has repeatedly held that no warrant is required to initiate a traffic stop if the police officer harbors a rea
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