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STATE v. LONGLEY11/1/1984
ongley voluntarily initiated the conversation in a public park, he was not a suspect of police investigation, nor was he restrained in a police-dominated atmosphere. See id.; see also State v. Cochran, 425 A.2d 999, 1002 (Me. 1981) (court can consider absence of police coercion, the defendant's cooperation, who initiated the contact, intent of the parties involved, and probable cause to arrest). Chief Perron did not mention the possibility of restraint until Longley had told the story of the collision.
Interrogations must be distinguished from "general investigations." State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d at 849. Evidence from the latter is admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings and include "neutral impersonal requests for information" and "follow-up questions . . . for the purpose of clarifying ambiguous situation." Id. at 849. The questions posed by Chief Perron in this case were neutral requests for information and attempts to clarify ambiguous responses: "What about it?"; "What do you think?"; "What happened?"; and "What do you want to do about that now?" do not constitute a police interrogation as defendant claims. The trial justice was warranted in concluding that Chief Perron did not engage in interrogation of Longley in a Miranda sense. The trial court did not err in allowing testimony about Longley's statements.
III. Accident Reconstruction Testimony
Defendant argues that the Superior Court justice committed prejudicial error in allowing State Police Trooper Gary Phillips to testify as an expert regarding the location of the collision between Longley's automobile and Officer Gallant. Longley asserts first, that Phillips did not possess the necessary qualifications to testify as an expert, and second, that Phillips impermissibly based his opinion on surmise and conjecture.
M.R.Evid. 702 states that expert witnesses who are qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Allowing expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Boutilier, 426 A.2d 876, 878 (Me. 1981).
Although Trooper Phillips' formal training in accident reconstruction was limited to three weeks, a period this court described in State v. Boutilier as "leaving a great deal to be desired," id., Phillips possesses adequate qualifications under the various criteria of Rule 702 to testify as an expert in this case. In addition to his specialized training, he attended a 30-hour course in basic accident investigation. He has taught in accident reconstruction programs, has reconstructed over 100 accidents himself and assisted in reconstructing 700-800 others (including 100 vehicle-pedestrian accidents), has qualified as an expert in other Maine trials, and has consulted with other state police departments on the subject. The trial court's decision that Phillips was qualified to testify as an expert on accident reconstruction certainly fell within its reasonable discretion.
Second, defendant alleges that Trooper Phillips' opinion was impermissibly based
An expert witness who reconstructs an accident from available data cannot be expected to testify to the exact events that occurred during an accident. We do not require that an expert testify with absolute certainty as to the validity of his assumptions and conclusions. See State v. Atkinson, 458 A.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Me. 1983); State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Me. 1979). "What we regard as requisite to the admissibility of proffered expert testimony is a showing of sufficient reliability to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of relevance and helpfulness, and of avoidance of prejudice to parity or confusion o
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