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STATE v. LONGLEY11/1/1984
f the fact-finder." State v. Boutilier, 426 A.2d at 879 (emphasis in original (discussing expert testimony based upon an allegedly scientific theory). Any lack of certainty by the expert affects the weight accorded his testimony, not its admissibility. State v. Atkinson, 458 A.2d at 1205; State v. Bridges, 413 A.2d 937, 942 (Me. 1980).
In this case, Trooper Phillips conducted a thorough investigation of the accident scene, attended the autopsy of Officer Gallant's body, examined the automobile involved at length, and conducted on-site experiments using Longley's AMC Hornet. None of the other witnesses contradicted the assumptions made by Phillips. All of the information compiled from those sources was considered by Phillips and used by him in reaching his conclusion.
Trooper Phillips had the expert qualifications necessary to assist the court by his opinion on the location of the accident. Obviously, since he was not a witness to the collision, his conclusions would be based on the logical inferences he drew from his investigation. Phillips conducted a complete and careful investigation, analyzed the available data, and formed an opinion to which he testified at trial. Any doubt that the defense could cast upon Phillips' qualifications or testimony go to weight, not to admissibility. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to admit the expert testimony of Phillips.
IV.
At the conclusion of four days of jury-waived trial, the Superior Court justice took the case under advisement and the next morning delivered his decision. After reciting his findings of fact, he stated his conclusions of law. His first conclusion was: " riving under the influence is both reckless and criminally negligent driving, per se." Defendant contends that applying a per se rule to determine a culpable state of mind would be erroneous.
We appreciate that the words of the trial justice's conclusion are susceptible to several interpretations, not all of which would require vacating the judgment in this case. The justice may have meant that the evidence he had heard proved that defendant's behavior (which clearly constituted operating under the influence) had been reckless and criminally negligent. Such an interpretation of the justice's statement is consistent with the settled Maine law that operating under the influence "is relevant evidence which the factfinder may consider
To be guilty of manslaughter a person must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have " ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, cause the death of another human being." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A). The terms "recklessly" and, alternatively, "with criminal negligence" are used by the code to identify the defendant's culpable mental state that the State must prove as a necessary element of the crime of manslaughter. Both terms "involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation." Id., § 35(3) (definition of "recklessly"); id., § 35(4) (definition of "criminal negligence"). The criminal code calls for an individualized determination by the factfinder in each case whether the State has sustained its burden of proof as to the defendant's mental state. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34 (1983).
The conditions that make a driver guilty of operating under the influence in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp. 1983-1984) are defined quite differently from the criminal code's definitions of "recklessly" and "with criminal negligence." A person is guilty of the Class D crime of "operating under the influence" if his mental or physical faculties are impaired "however slightly," i.e., "to any extent." See State v. Bean,
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