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State v. Hicks7/16/1982 on of the mortal wounds. State v. Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366 (1981).
Here, the pictures were relevant to the issue of premeditation. They illustrated how the victim was shot from behind at close range while seated normally in his truck. The pictures were helpful to the jury in understanding expert testimony about the distance of the barrel of the shotgun from the victim's head, the angle of entry, and the peculiar configuration of the wound. The trial court expressly found that the probative value of these two photographs outweighed any possible prejudice. We note that the trial court excluded numerous
other photographs it found to be cumulative or more likely to arouse the passions of the jury. The trial court exercised its discretion in a sound and proper manner.
REFERENCE TO KNOWN FINGERPRINTS
During defense counsel's cross-examination of the police identification technician the following exchange took place:
Q. You found this particular print in your dusting?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you compared it, I think, to the fingerprints that you obtained from Mr. Hicks after he had been arrested; is that correct?
A. No, sir. I believe it was just known prints.
Q. Okay. So you compared it and you found that the print on the truck of [the victim's] vehicle [ sic ] did not match the print that you had of Mr. Hicks; is that right?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would like to reserve a legal matter, if I may, for later.
THE COURT: Certainly.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the response he elicited from the officer allowed the jury to infer that Hicks had a criminal record. The trial court denied the motion reasoning that there are many common contexts other than criminality in which a person's fingerprints may be recorded, such as military service or employment matters. Hicks asserts that the trial court's ruling was reversible error. We cannot agree.
Although the general rule is that evidence which shows that the defendant may have committed other crimes is inadmissible, State v. Thompson, 126 Ariz. 3, 612 P.2d 54 (1980), we do not find the testimony that the latent prints were compared to appellant's "known prints", without more, to be indicative of a prior criminal record. The record does not disclose whether the "known prints" were in fact obtained as the result of an arrest.
Appellant would have us equate evidence of "known prints" with "mug shot" evidence which we have previously held to be error because of the prejudicial effect it could have on the jury. State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 1143, 43 L.Ed.2d 411 (1975); State v. Cross, 123 Ariz. 494, 600 P.2d 1126 (App.1979). This we refuse to do because of the fundamental difference between "mug shots" and "known prints". The term "mug shot" is synonymous with post-arrest picture, whereas fingerprints, as the trial judge observed, may be "known" for a number of reasons not associated with criminality. Here, the jury was made aware that appellant had been in the Air Force. No mention was made of any prior arrest except that appellant himself told the jury that he thought he had been arrested for "another D.W.I." It is reasonable to assume that the "known prints" were not obtained because of any prior criminal conduct on the part of appellant other than that he disclosed himself. Therefore we find n
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