 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Hicks7/16/1982
o error. See State v. McGuire, 113 Ariz. 372, 555 P.2d 330 (1976); State v. Finn, 111 Ariz. 271, 528 P.2d 615 (1974).
Furthermore, the testimony was responsive and initiated by defense counsel's questioning; thus any error, had there been any, might well be considered invited and not grounds for reversal. State v. Lawrence, 123 Ariz. 301, 599 P.2d 754 (1979); State v. Stoneman, 115 Ariz. 594, 566 P.2d 1340 (1977).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court which precluded the defense from offering psychiatric testimony concerning the effect of alcohol on the defendant's state of mind.
The legislature has established the parameters for the use of evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication. A.R.S. § 13-503 provides:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in
such condition, but when the actual existence of the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of offense, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the culpable mental state with which he committed the act.
We have previously held that the effect of alcohol intoxication is an area within the common knowledge and experience of the jury, and therefore, no expert testimony is needed to assist the trier of fact. State v. Laffoon, 125 Ariz. 484, 610 P.2d 1045 (1980); State v. Means, 115 Ariz. 502, 566 P.2d 303 (1977). Thus, it is proper for a trial court to preclude psychiatric testimony relating to the effect of alcohol upon the ability to form specific intent. Id.
Appellant would have us find that Laffoon does not control where the intoxication is related to chronic alcoholism and there is evidence that the accused may have suffered a black-out at the time of the crime. Instead, appellant asserts that susceptibility to alcoholic black-outs is a character trait making relevant psychiatric testimony admissible under State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981).
Christensen allows expert testimony only where it assists the trier of fact to recognize a character trait of the particular defendant. Such testimony may only be used as evidence that the defendant possesses such a trait and it must be left to the jury to determine whether and how the trait affected the defendant's specific intent at the time of the alleged crime.
In the instant case, expert testimony would add nothing to the existing evidence that appellant might have had an alcoholic black-out at the time of the shooting. Appellant had a blood alcohol level of .26 percent three or four hours after the shooting. Witnesses testified to having seen him drink large amounts of alcohol on the day and night in question. He testified that he had been a chronic alcoholic for many years. No expert is needed to establish that appellant may have had an alcoholic black-out on the night of the shooting. Indeed, the psychiatrists themselves base their opinions that a black-out is possible on appellant's professed inability to remember anything of the night.
Our examination of the psychiatrists' reports reveals only that the experts concluded that appell
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Arizona DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|