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State v. Hicks7/16/1982
ant's ability to form specific intent may have been impaired. A.R.S. § 13-503 does as much. None of the psychiatrists stated that alcoholic black-outs preclude premeditation of an intent to kill. Given the statutory directive of A.R.S. § 13-503, all that remains is a fact question for the jury: was appellant's mental state less than intentional, or were his acts less than premeditated at the time of the shooting, by reason of his severe intoxication. The jury must decide this question in the same way a psychiatrist would have to decide it; that is, by looking at the facts surrounding the shooting. The record contains ample evidence from which the jury, which was properly instructed, could have found that appellant acted with premeditation and with the intent to kill notwithstanding his inability to remember so doing.
We hold that State v. Laffoon, supra, is controlling and the trial court properly denied appellant's very general request for psychiatric proof on the issue of alcoholic black-outs as it relates to specific intent under Arizona law.
Appellant claims that federal constitutional guarantees mandate admission of psychiatric testimony which negates specific intent. That argument was considered and rejected in Wahrlich v. State of Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1011, 94 S.Ct. 375, 38 L.Ed.2d 249 (1973) where the court stated:
Among the considerations that we have taken into account in refusing to accept Wahrlich's argument are these: (1) in the interest of harmonious federal-state relations, federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the state's trial of criminal cases; (2) courts should be extremely reluctant to constitutionalize rules of evidence; (3) the state of the
developing art of psychiatry is such that we are not convinced that psychiatric testimony directed to a retrospective analysis of the subtle gradations of specific intent has enough probative value to compel its admission.
Id. at 1138. The Wahrlich court also deemed the effect of intoxicants upon state of mind to be part of common human experience which factfinders can understand and apply without expert assistance.
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT
Prior to trial appellant filed a motion to suppress the statement he made to police officers on the night of the shooting. A voluntariness hearing was held in which the trial court heard the evidence concerning the taking of appellant's statement. Included in the evidence presented to the trial court were two tape cassettes used to record the interrogation between the defendant and the police. The tapes were played in their entirety at the hearing so the trial judge could hear what actually occurred at the interview with the defendant.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, expressly finding that in spite of appellant's intoxication, his statement was voluntary and he knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights.
Appellant alleges error on two grounds. First, he claims that his intoxication rendered him incompetent to validly waive his constitutional rights. Secondly, appellant contends that the police interrogation involved violated the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
It is a denial of due process to admit an incriminatory statement into evidence that is involuntary by reason of extreme intoxication. State v. Porter, 122 Ariz. 453, 595 P.2d 998 (1979). Proof that the accused was intoxicated at the t
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