State v. Luna1/28/1980
401 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Holmes v. United States, 124 U.S. App.D.C. 152, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Moreover, a bifurcated trial may itself, in some circumstances, violate a person's due process rights where an ordinary trial would not. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009, 91 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1971); Sanchez v. State 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977); contra, Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 2d 1302 (1952). We hold, on this issue, that until our Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Court are amended to accommodate for such a change in the order of a trial, the order prescribed by Rule 40 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts should be followed. N.M.R. Crim.P. 40, N.M.S.A. 1978.
III. The defendant's next claim is that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing lay witnesses to give their opinion as to defendant's sanity. We do not agree. The witnesses, two cellmates and an acquaintance of defendant, were allowed to testify before the jury as to their observations of defendant's behavior. This Court has held that the opinion testimony of laymen may be received on the question of insanity, in the court's discretion, based upon the opportunity and knowledge of the witness to form an opinion. State v. Lujan, 87 N.M. 400, 534 P.2d 1112 (1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S. Ct. 469, 46 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1975), see N.M.R. Evid. 701, N.M.S.A. 1978. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based upon the evidence, could have properly ruled that the witnesses did not have a sufficient basis on which to form an opinion, or that their opinion would not have been helpful to a clear understanding of the issue.
IV. The defendant also argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the defendant's theories of the case. The defendant tendered an instruction stating that even if he was found sane at the time of the crime, the jury must still determine whether he had an ability to form an intent to commit the underlying felony. See N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 41.00, Use Note 4, N.M.S.A. 1978. Though this may be a correct statement of the law, the matter was adequately covered by other instructions given which unambiguously instructed on intent to commit aggravated burglary. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 16.22 N.M.S.A. 1978. Under the circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the tendered instruction could not have been beneficial, in any way, to the defendant, particularly when considered by a jury of lay people. The refusal to give the requested instruction was not error. See State v. Valenzuela, 90 N.M. 25, 559 P.2d 402 (1976).
Defendant argues that an instruction on diminished capacity should have been given. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 41.11, N.M.S.A. 1978. The record, however, does not contain any evidence which reasonably tends to show that defendant's claimed intoxication rendered him incapable of acting in a purposeful way. The tendered instruction was properly refused. State v. Gardner, 85 N.M. 104, 509 P.2d 871 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 851, 94 S. Ct. 145, 38 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1973).
V. Defendant's next claim is that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as to the felony-murder charge. We disagree with this claim for two reasons. First, the necessary mens rea for first-degree murder is presumed where the underlying felony is inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life. State v. Harrison,
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