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State v. Luna1/28/1980
->90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977). There was sufficient evidence that the defendant could form the intent to commit aggravated burglary, and the jury found that he did have the requisite intent. Secondly, the record contains conflicting evidence as to the defendant's sanity at the time the stabbing was initiated. There was testimony that defendant knew his acts could kill Ms. Nelson, that he knew his actions were wrong, and that he
could have stopped himself from stabbing her. This evidence was sufficient to allow the issue of defendant's sanity to go to the jury. If the defendant could have stopped himself from stabbing the victim, knew the nature and quality of his act and knew that it was wrong, the jury could find the defendant sane. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954). The test for insanity is not whether the defendant is incapable of terminating his wrongful act. The trial court acted properly in allowing the jury to consider the issue.
VI. The defendant's next claim is that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972), this Court held that it was not error for a court to refuse to give such an instruction to the jury. Defendant asks that we overrule that case, but we decline to do so. We are of the opinion that " he tendered instruction presented an irrelevant issue for consideration by the jury." Id. at 310, 502 P.2d at 1000.
VII. The defendant's final contention is that certain of the trial court's errors had a cumulative effect amounting to the absence of a fair trial. We disagree on the basis that any cumulative effect was slight in comparison with the evidence of guilt which was properly admitted. The claimed errors did not contribute to the conviction. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972).
For the foregoing reasons the Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court affirmed as to the warrantless searches of the automobile at the police station. We further find, however, that suppressing said evidence obtained and deleting it from the affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant of the defendant's home would not have lead to the denial of the issuance of the search warrant. The claimed errors, therefore, not being prejudicial, and the defendant having been accorded a fair trial, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: H. VERN PAYNE, Justice, WILLIAM R. FEDERICI, Justice
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