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KENNEDY v. STATE10/1/1973
r every day and also drinks whiskey. She said she had been drinking like that ever since she was 17 years of age; that she thinks she is an alcoholic; that she attempted to stop drinking but has been unable to do so.
We are of the opinion that the court did not err in admitting the appellant's statement into evidence. Certainly her answers to questions asked her were direct and responsive and there is nothing in the answers that
would indicate she was under any mental or physical disability at the time they were made. There is some conflicting testimony as to the amount of alcoholic beverages the appellant had consumed and the effect if had upon her, but there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the appellant was advised of her constitutional rights as set out in Miranda and that she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to the services of an attorney at the time she gave her statement and that she intelligently and knowingly did so.
In Reed v. State, 255 Ark. 63, 498 S.W.2d 887, we reversed the conviction for error in admitting a statement of the accused into evidence without warning and advice of his constitutional right to the services of an attorney at the time of arrest as set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A similar deficiency appears in the warning given by Officer Young in the case at bar. He did not advise the appellant that an attorney would be appointed for her if she was unable to employ one. The record is not clear whether Officer Young was attempting to warn the appellant of her constitutional rights before questioning her, of whether he was attempting to determine if she had already been warned of her constitutional rights. In any event, according to Officer Wilson, he gave the appellant the complete Miranda warning approximately three and one-half hours before Officer Young talked to her and before she made her statement. The appellant testified that if such warning was given her by Officer Wilson, she had forgotten about it.
In Brooke v. State, 86 Ark. 364 111 S.W.2d 471, a public drunkenness ordinance was under attack. The defendant had been charged with violation of the ordinance and in that case we cited with approval the standard dictionary definition of drunk as being:
"`Under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to have lost the normal control of one's bodily and mental faculties, and commonly to evince a disposition to violence, quarrelsomeness and bestiality.'"
In Miller v. State, 251 Ark. 502, 474 S.W.2d 112, the appellant signed a waiver of his constitutional rights but testified at an in-chambers hearing that he had been drinking and did not remember whether his constitutional rights had been explained to him or not. His testimony was to the effect that he was too drunk to read and too drunk to know what was going on at the time he signed the waiver and statement. In that case we held that the trial court did not err in admitting the statement into evidence as voluntarily made and in doing so we pointed out that the appellant had no difficulty remembering other events in connection with his arrest and detention.
In Hale v. State, 252 Ark. 1040, 483 S.W.2d 228, we approved the action of the trial court in admitting a statement made to arresting officers 90 minutes after the accused as given the Miranda warning and we distinguished that case from Scott v. State, 251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W.2d 699, where there was a 90 day lapse of time between the giving of the warning and the admissions made by the accused.
In the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa. 457, 291 A.2d 103 (1972), the conflict in the evidence was ver
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