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Tanksley v. Commonwealth1/6/2003
This an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County denying Cheryl K. Tanksley's (Licensee) appeal from the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing's (Bureau) suspension of her motor vehicle operator's license. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order.
On March 3, 2001, Licensee was charged with driving while intoxicated. One month later, on April 4, 2001, she pled guilty with civil reservation in New Jersey to violating N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a) by driving while intoxicated. Shortly thereafter, the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles sent official notice of the New Jersey conviction to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Consequently, on May 3, 2001, the Bureau informed Licensee that, pursuant to Sections 1532(b) and 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1532(b) and 1581, it was suspending her motor vehicle operator's license for one year. Licensee filed a timely appeal with the trial court.
At the January 24, 2002 hearing, the Bureau presented certified, documentary evidence of the New Jersey conviction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an order denying Licensee's appeal and upholding the suspension. Licensee's appeal to this Court followed.
On appeal, Licensee raises three arguments for this Court to consider. In Licensee's first argument, she asserts that the New Jersey driving while intoxicated statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Drivers License Compact, 75 Pa.C.S. §1581, (Compact). Second, she maintains that issuance of the Pennsylvania license suspension for the New Jersey driving while intoxicated conviction violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Third, she contends that issuance of the suspension under the Compact violated her constitutional rights. In response, the Bureau contends these arguments are without merit, and asks the Court to impose sanctions. We address these arguments seriatim.
Licensee's first argument is that the New Jersey statute which authorizes sanctions for any alcohol impairment is not substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact, "which requires impairment to a degree which renders the operator incapable of safely driving." This issue has been well settled by our appellate courts. Both this Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have repeatedly found the New Jersey driving while intoxicated statute substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. See, e.g., Scott v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 567 Pa. 631, 790 A.2d 291 (2002); Kulp v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 795 A.2d 471 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Because this issue has been extensively dealt with in these decisions, we need not address it further here. Accordingly, we reject Licensee's argument that N.J.S.A. § 39:4-50(a) is not substantially similar to Article IV of the Compact.
Licensee's second issue on appeal has also been previously addressed. In Bourdeev v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 59 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), affirmed on the opinion of this Court, 566 Pa. 591, 782 A.2d 539 (2001), we reversed a trial court decision which held that suspending a license based upon a New Jersey plea of guilty with civil reservation would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. We reasoned that:
While the New Jersey Rule of Court which allows a civil reservation with guilty pleas prohibits the use of the plea itself in any civil proceeding, it does not bar the introduction of evidence of the conviction that resulted from the guilty plea. Clearly, in this
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